REASON and JUDGEMENT:

OR,

SPECIAL REMARQUES

Of the

L I F E

Of the *Renowned*

Dr. *SANDERSON*,

Late Lord Biſhop of *Lincoln.*

Together with his

JUDGEMENT

FOR

SETLING the *CHURCH*;

In exact

RESOLUTIONS

Of ſundry grand *CASES* very ſeaſonable at THIS TIME.

BIBL. CANT. ACAD.

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

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Biſhop *Sanderſon*'s ſecond Sermon, (*ad Populum*)
Page 211. E.

THere is a *Warning* for us, to take conſideration of the loſs of *good* or *uſeful* men; and to *fear*, when they are *going* from us, that ſome evil is *coming* to us. The Prophet complaineth of the too great and general neglect hereof in his time: *The righteous periſheth, and no man layeth it to heart; and merciful men are taken away, none conſidering that the righteous is taken from the evil to come*, Eſay 57. 1. When God ſendeth his *Angel* to pluck out his righteous *Lots*, what may *Sodom* expect but *fire* and *brimſtone* to be rained down upon them? When he plucketh up the faireſt and choiceſt *flowers* in his Garden, & croppeth off the tops of the goodlieſt *Poppies*, who can think other then that he meaneth

eth to lay his *Garden* waſte, and to turn it into a wilde *Wilderneſs*? When he underminеth the main *Pillars* of the houſe, taketh away the very *props* and *buttreſſes* of Church and Commonwealth; ſweepeth away religious *Princes*, wiſe *Senators*, zealous *Magiſtrates*, painful *Miniſters*, men of eminent *ranks*, *gifts* or *example*; who ſhall be ſecure tha either *Churh* or *Commonweal* ſhall ſtand up long, and not *totter* at leaſt, if not *fall*? God in *mercy* taketh ſuch away from the *evil* to come; we in *wiſdom* ſhould look for *evil* to come, when God taketh ſuch away.

REASON and JUDGEMENT:

OR,

SPECIAL REMARQUES

Of the

LIFE

Of the *Renowned*

Dr. SANDERSON,

Late Lord Bishop of *Lincoln*:

In a Letter to the Reverend

J. W. D. D. P. L.

SIR,

I Am equally sorry that I cannot satisfie your just desire in the Remarques of our Renowned *Diocesan's Life*, as that I must comply with your sad fear in the too true report of his *Death*; that I must assure you we have lost the man, and what was mortal in him, and yet cannot help you to his vertues, and what was immortal in him: that when I must write you the news that he is dead to the world, I cannot draw a character wherein he may *live* with the good and vertuous for ever. "The

"wise,

"wise, the holy and the good, live more nobly in "their vertues and graces in the hearts of others, "then they did in their own bodies.

His modesty wrapped him in that privacy, and his place kept him at that distance, that I cannot take his portraicture, nor recount his memorials so exactly as I could wish, and you may expect: yet though for no other cause then for this, "That "Posterity may know we have not loosely through "silence permitted things and persons to pass away "as in a dream; there shall be thus much extant concerning this excellent person, for his own honour, and the honour of the Church he was bred in, That he was a Bishop, and a man of most sound Judgement, of most deep Learning, of a vast Apprehension, of an holy and unspotted Life, of an unsuspected Integrity; a great Friend, a faithful Servant, a valiant Champion of the Church. More particularly there shall be extant, 1. His Education: 2. His temper of body and minde: 3. The great instances of his Life: 4. His Person and Aspect: 5. His Works or Writings: 6. His Sufferings: 7. His Rewards and Preferments: And lastly and chiefly, his Judgement and Resolution of those Cases of Conscience that concern the Discipline or Worship of our Church:——wherein you will observe something *admirable*, many things *imitable*, all things *commendable*.

Sect. 1. *His Education.*

When his Parents observed that he was capable of advancing the Worshipfulness of his Birth by the excellency of his Parts, his pregnant Wit, his large and capacious Understanding, his

his fixed Judgement, his faithful Memory, and his hopeful Seriousness, they took care that his youth and first years of reason should not be lost, but (being hardly recovered if neglected) be carefully improved in all good Learning: of which he was not onely capable, but comprehensive, in a severe and exact Grammar-School; where, by an unwearied diligence, a silent, sedentary, and astonished way of following his Book, a seriousness beyond his years, (Oh how would he steal away from his Companions follies, to his severer tasks and privacies!) he made his way thorow all things on which he could fix, to an exactness in Greek and Latine, which he retained to his dying day. And he would observe, "That an exactness in School-"learning was a great advantage to our higher stu-"dies; as the miscarriages of School are not eas-"ly recovered in the University:—— the errours of the first Concoction being hardly rectified in the second.

At School he observed, he learned an art of memory. When he was enjoyned to learn what he understood not, (which was then an ordinary miscarriage in Grammar-Schools) he was compelled to make use of similitudes, *&c.* and to remember those things he knew not, to think upon something like them he knew. As he had many excellent Observations touching Schools, which he would say were the most considerable places in a Kingdome: so he would usually say, "That the *Practical Way* is "the best; when as *Aristotle* speaks, *We learn that by doing, which we learn to do.*

And now I would willingly enlarge on his minority, and his first appearance in solid and pious Learning, with which he always abounded; but that it is like the beginning of *Nilus*, hardly to be found; and we know no minority of his, being one that did ἐν ἀνδράσιν, excel his equals and himself; in a staid worth above his years and time, always eminent, always excellent. And therefore I follow him furnished with excellent Rules of Grammar and Rhetorick, with choice pieces of History, Poetry and Oratory, with an elegancie in Latine, a good judgement in Greek; serious in his designe, prudent in his study, industrious in his way, clear in his apprehension, searching in his understanding; serene, orderly and methodical in his thoughts; sober and civil in his carriage: (the School having added to his great Parts that humility, meekness, modesty, obedience and civility, as, advantaged by his good disposition, rendred him to his dying day submissive to Superiours, obliging to his Equals, tender to his Inferiours, amiable and charitable to all.) I follow him (with as much duty, observance and affection, though not with so much ability as other men) to the University of *Oxford*; where, in *Lincoln*-Colledge, with a slow, but sure pace, he proceeded in all rational and solid Learning: his unwearied minde struggling with the intricacies, perplexities, darkness and confusion of Nature, and aiming at that clear and genuine apprehension of things we were created in, *after the image of God, in knowledge*: not so intent upon the notions, as the nature of things. As

he

he had attained to so much Grammar as enabled him to speak his minde properly, and so much Rhetorick as to express it perswasively: so he endeavoured to gain so much Logick as might order, guide and direct his thoughts *methodically*; in *apprehending* things *distinctly*; in *judging* of them *exactly*; in finding out the truth that lies in them *successfully*; in *discovering* the errours, deceits and fallacies imposed upon us in them *evidently*; and *urging* the truths found out *convincingly*. His way was, 1. to *write* the Rules his Tutor suggested, or his Books afforded: (for he writ most he read or heard, as he said, *to stay his active and young soul upon things, until he had distinctly conceived them.*) 2. To debate those Rules with himself and others, which he had so written. 3. To practise them upon some Question or other, till they became as his native Reason, as his own soul. Whereby he afterwards attained in all cases a great happiness to comprehend things fully, to state Controversies exactly, to lay them before others both clearly and compendiously; to finde out the merit of a Cause, the right joynt of a Question exactly; to confirm a Truth pertinently, properly and acutely: insomuch that as he composed a new Logick, an excellent way of Reasoning; so he was himself for many years the *publike Reason* of the Church: looking into Debates deeply, opening them solidly and conspicuously, determining them impartially, conscientiously and clearly; pressing Truth and Duty convincingly: his Reasons were strong and demonstrative, his Allegations close and pertinent, his Observations

choice and prudent; his Deductions clear, his Cenſure impartial, his Expreſſions apt, ſuitable, weighty and accurate; his Diſcourſe ſteady, judicious, undiſtracted, made up of abſtract notions of Reaſon, Experience and Religion; his Thoughts calm, ſmoothe, and methodical. He was a great engroſſer of private Syſtemes and Papers; and he would ſay, *The united Reaſon of many induſtrious and ſerious ſearchers after the Truth, make one compleat man.* He would gather the acuteſt Arguments he found among Philoſophers, to *quicken*, though not to *inſtruct* himſelf: theſe ſmart trifles (he would ſay) would help us to that acuteneſs and diſtinctneſs of apprehenſion that might be uſeful in greater matters: and it was equally uſeful and pleaſant to obſerve the various workings of ſeveral Reaſons with mens ſeveral defects and excellencies; by the correcting the one whereof, and imitating the other, a man might raiſe a frame of ſoul moſt knowing, moſt clear, and almoſt innocent. He adviſed yong men to "advance towards a clear underſtanding "of any thing by theſe ſteps: 1. To underſtand "the word by which it is expreſſed, in all its acce- "ptations. 2. To underſtand all the words in the "learned Languages, by which that thing is ex- "preſſed; with the Original of thoſe words, and "the reaſon why they were made uſe of to expreſs "that thing; with all the words that are neer to "it, and their ſignification. 3. Then to appre- "hend the nature of the thing, with what it hath "common with other things, and what it hath ſpe- "cial in it ſelf; what relation it hath to other

things

"things in the world; whence it proceeded; for "what end it was made: with other things that "are like it. Thus to know a few things exactly, is "to be very learned. As to any Question that "was to be debated, the words (he said) must be "clearly understood, and the notion of the things "in debate stated; and then, what is granted on "all sides concerning the things rightly understood "must be shewed; *and what is controverted (as there will be very little, when words and things are well understood) must be clearly laid down as it is understood on all hands, and convincingly proved by a proper reason from the nature of the thing, or from authority, pressed and cleared from all evasions, cavils and subterfuges; which cavils must be proposed faithfully and honestly, and answered briefly and fully, ingeniously, candidly and modestly.*

His advice about reading of Authors was this: 1. To observe the nature of the thing handled, and so know what to look for from him, what part of Learning he may satisfie you in. 2. To observe the Author, and the occasion, time and way of writing. 3. To observe what is said of the thing handled in direct Propositions. 4. To note what is said indirectly of it out of other Learning, as Rhetorick, Philology, History, *&c.* 5. To take notice what new Explications the Author useth beyond what we have in the old Learning: his several Conclusions and Arguments, with the Topicks from whence they are taken; with his answer to Arguments and Objections. He would say, "It was no less then a miracle of knowledge

that

"that men might attain to, if they proceeded thus "diſtinctly in reading Authors, and in purſuing "after knowledge. He adviſed young men to uſe Common-place-books; in the beginning whereof, there might be a common table, containing the general heads of the book: under which generally, the ſpecial heads may be written, with references to the pages where thoſe heads are handled, with a little blank ſpace after each ſort of heads, wherein more heads if we meet with them may be inſerted: for every head let there be reſerved a page, where what notable ſentence, notion, rule or particular ſoever is ſuggeſted to us in reading, meditating, diſcourſing, may be written and reſerved for future uſe. His minde thus guided by ſure and conſtant Rules of Reaſon, made the more methodical, and ſo more happier progreſs in learning Languages and Intellectual Sciences, Philoſophy, Hiſtory, Poetry, Philology, and the whole circle of Learning; which he throughly ſtudied, and methodically digeſted, making each part illuſtrate and help another, until he became a great Maſter of the whole,——and his Parts voted him Fellow of the Houſe, (an excellent advantage for young men to improve their firſt years of prudence and diſcretion) and made him an eminent Tutor in the Univerſity, where he at once learned and taught, advancing his own Parts and Reaſon, while he improved his Pupils: *I learn*, ſaid he, *much from my Maſter, more from my Equals, and moſt of all from my Diſciples.* And indeed he allowed himſelf no other diverſion then what the giving encouragement and inſtruc-

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on to ingenious young Students yeilded him: (a thing he peculiarly delighted in, as wherein he could observe the several weaknesses of Reason, and their respective remedies.)

Here he was as retired as he could; being able, but not forward to appear, and very willing to improve himself. His modest thoughts and distrust of himself made him a while satisfie himself with the conscience of well-doing, having the highest pleasure of enjoying Worth without noise, and Vertue without applause; being a great *Stream* of Learning, without noise, *deep* and *clear*.

Sect 2. *His Industry.*

While he was in the University, he generally spent eleven hours a day in study: which industry of his, dispatched the whole course of Philosophy, and picked out in a manner all that was useful in all Classick Authors that are extant; drawing Indexes for his private use, either in his own Paper-book, or at the beginning and end of each book: which will testifie his indefatigable pains to as many as shall peruse his excellent and well-chosen Study. This assiduity continued to his dying day, as if he had resolved to depart studying, and go immediately from his pursuit of *revealed truth*, to the view of the *eternal*. He disposed himself and time to perpetual industry and diligence; not only avoiding, but perfectly hating idleness, and hardly recommending any thing more then this; *Be always furnished with somewhat to do, as the best way to innocence and pleasure.* There was not a minute of the day he left vacant from business of necessity, civility or study: you should hardly see him without his

his book, or hardly meet him without his plodding thoughts and meditations. A clear and calm way he had of weighing duely what he ſhould do, in deſigning what he had conſidered, and ſoberly performing what he had deſigned. His minde was wholly inward, where lay his Scœnes of diſcreet, prudent and pious undertakings. In ſickneſſes, if they were not ſo violent as to make the recollection of his thoughts impoſſible, he never intermitted ſtudy, but rather re-inforced, as the beſt eaſe of his diſtemper, and diverſion of his pain. His way was to caſt into paper his Obſervations, and direct them to his great deſigne. I may ſay of him, as the reverend Dr. *Fell* ſaith of his good friend the excellent Dr. *Hammond*, That conſidering his time of prayer and inſtructing his family, his peruſal of the writings of friends and ſtrangers when intended to be publick, his review of his own works, his reception of viſits, whether for civility or for reſolution of conſcience, or information in point of difficulty, which were numerous, and great devourers of his time, (he being reckoned the ableſt and faithfulleſt Caſuiſt in the world) his general Correſpondencies by Letters, which took up the proportion of a day in each Week, and more: I ſay, he that ſhall conſider theſe inſtances of diligence, beſides his own vaſt reading, muſt be to ſeek what point of time remained undiſpoſed of, and *learn to redeem the time*.

Sect. 3. *His Temper.*

It pleaſed God he had a body ſuited to that pains he was deſigned for; a faithful Aſſiſtant rather then an impediment to his great Soul; ſymbolizing with

with it in an exact temper, neither failing it through the weakneſs of organs, nor burthening it with the redundancy of humours, nor clogging it with ſad melancholy, nor diſturbing it with an active unſetledneſs, nor ruffling it with angry choler; neither too large for it, nor too narrow, but every way proportionable. Although he indeed was pleaſed to write thus of himſelf in his Preface to his Book of the Obligation of *Conſcience*:

Nimirùm, ut ignavus miles quem ſola fortem facit deſperatio, *tum demum acris fertur ad pugnam, cum nullus reliquus eſt effugio locus: ita mihi ingenium eſt. Des otium, ſpatium, tempus!* nil ſic. Vexantur fruſtra calami, *diffluit mens, vagatur, excurrit, torpet. In arctum cogas! Subſiſtit, excitatur, recolligit vires, quaſque habet, quandoquidem exerto eſt opus, exerit univerſas: & ut verbo dicam, quod agi neceſſe eſt,* hoc agit. *Ut ſolis radii, qui laxo liberoque cœlo diffuſi ſic modice calefaciunt vix ut ſentias, iidem in concavi ſpeculi umbonem, velut in centrum coacti adductique, uoriter urunt. Multo uſu & prima lanugine ad hanc vanitatem edoctus didici, quam non ſit vanum illud Pythagoræ hemiſtichium,*

Quod ignavæ mentis vitium, etsi nonnullis fortasse videri possit habere modestiæ speciem aliquam, mihi tamen una hac idonea excusatione defendi posse videtur, quod sit certis quibusdam hominibus, (& ego in hoc censu) ἐμφύες καὶ συγγενὲς πᾶσι, *ita congenitum insitumque ab ipsis cunabulis, ut frustra sit, quisquis ex illo numero id ulla speret* [a] *se posse, vel arte corrigi, vel industria superari:*

Yet I am assured that he never considered longer then till he could discern whether things proposed were fit, or no: when that was determined, he would without any slow delay (in spending that time to gaze upon a business which might serve to do it) go about another; when he had perfected one business, he could not endure his soul should stand still, but he instantly considered what was next to be undertaken; constant course of business running along with a constant course of time.

Sect 4. *His Carriage.*

His Carriage grave, comely, and modest; his Garb plain and studious, such as became a great Scholar and a solemne Divine, alwaies meditating some great and good design, retiring within himself, and taken up with his own great thoughts: equal in all his actions; doing nothing rash, violent, or pecipitant in his words, gesture, or understanding; even and composed, entire, modestly endeavouring what he thought his duty: diligently pursuing what was within his reach, and resolvedly

ſolvedly fixt upon what he judged within his capacity, the ἀνὴρ τετράγωνος, "the ſquare and *ſolid man*, "*ſeldome failing, and therefore ſeldome repenting*: his ſpeech was as calm and even as his ſoul, ſo ſober, ſo ſteady, ſo apt, ſo ordered, ſo weighty when ſerious; ſo pleaſant when devoted to an harmleſs mirth, which became him no leſs then ſmiling and a little laughter doth a good man and a good conſcience; for his innocent facetiouſneſs was well tempered with gravity, mixed with good counſel, allayed with good diſcourſe, and beautified with excellent example: if he would ſpeak facetiouſly, no man did it or could do it more pleaſingly: if he liſted to diſpute ſolidly, none did it more ſatisfactorily: he was choice in his friends, and faithful to them; friendſhip when true and ſincere, he would ſay, was the greateſt happineſs and relief among the cares and troubles of the world, eſpecially with thoſe who were of the ſame inclination, profeſſion, ſtudy and deſignment with himſelf; an union of mind is next the union of ſoul and body in the world; and friendſhip is next unto life: and it was this reverend perſons buſineſs, where-ever he was, to promote thoſe two great things, friendſhip and love, that (as he uſed to ſay) men might have thoſe that charitably obſerved, and faithfully admoniſhed them of the failings, indecencies, and miſcarriages Nature is obnoxious to; which he exactly performed, and expected back again to be returned to himſelf: he was conſtant in his kindneſs, as long as friends were true; but as he could

easily discern and look through, so he deeply resented all artifice and cunning: a plain man he was, and a plain temper he loved; if any mischance happened that might occasion misapprehensions, he suffered them not to improve by concealment: but presently offered the reasons of the misunderstanding, and enjoyned all friends to return him the like measure back again, if his own actions seemed at any time doubtful or unseemly.

Sect. 5. *His Moderation.*

Ἀνέχου καὶ ἀπέχου make up *Epictetus* his Philosophy, *sustine & abstine* made our Reverend Diocesans Religion: none understood better how all things are lawful, none understood better then he how all things are not expedient; he knew temptations lye in ambush, behind our lawful enjoyments: in his apparel none more plain, in his dyet none more temperate, eating (as he would say) rationally, *onely for health and life*; one meal a day sufficed him, with some fruit at night: in his sleep none more sparing, eleven or twelve at night being his usual time of going to rest, and five, and very rarely six, the hour of his rising: recreations which his judgement allowed, yet his care and self-denial forbid him; *ab illicitis semper quandoque à licitis*, was his rule: he would say, Things unlawful we must never do; nor ever lawful things, but with due respect of our *calling* and other concurrent *circumstances*. *Wine* and *musick*, and gorgeous *apparel*, and delicate *fare*, are such things as God in his goodness hath created and given to the children of men for their comfort; and they may use

uſe them lawfully, and take comfort in them as their portion: but he that ſhall uſe any of them *intemperately*, or *unſeaſonably*, or *vainly*, or *waſtfully*, abuſeth both them and himſelf. And therefore we ſhall often finde both the things themſelves condemned, and thoſe that uſed them blamed in the Scriptures. The men of Iſrael for *ſtretching themſelves upon their couches, and eating the lambs out of the flock, and chaunting to the ſound of the Viol, and drinking Wine in bowls*, *Amos* 6. And the women for their *bracelets, and ear-rings, and wimples, and criſping pins*, and their other bravery, in *Eſay* 3. And the rich man for *faring deliciouſly and wearing fine linnen*, in the Parable, *Luk.* 16. Yea, our Saviour himſelf pronounceth a woe againſt them that *laugh*, *Luk.* 6. And yet none of all theſe things are or were *in themſelves* unlawful: it was the *exceſs* onely, or other *diſorder* in the uſe of them, that made them obnoxious to reproof. Though ſome in their heat have ſaid ſo, yet who can reaſonably ſay, that *horſe-matches*, or playing at *cards* or *dice*, are in themſelves and wholly *unlawful*? And yet on the other ſide, what ſober wiſe man, becauſe the Things are *lawful*, would therefore approve of that vain and ſinful expence which is oftentimes beſtowed by men of mean eſtates in *the dieting* of Horſes, and *wagering* upon them; or of that exceſſive abuſe of *gaming*, wherein thouſands of our Gentry ſpend in a manner their whole *time*, and conſume away their whole *ſubſtance*, both which ought to be far more precious unto them? I might inſtance in many other things in like manner. In

all

all which, we may easily erre either in point of *judgement*, or *practice*, or both; if we do not wisely sever *the use* from the *abuse*. Many times because *the abuses* are common and great, we peevishly *condemn* in others *the very use* of some *lawful things*. And many times again, because there is evidently a *lawful use* of the things, we impudently *justifie* our selves in the very *abuses* also. That is foolish *precisenes* in us; and this prophane *partiality*: by that we *infringe* our brethrens liberty; by this, *pollute* our own. The best and safest way for us in all *indifferent things* is this: to be indulgent to *others*, but strict to *our selves*; in allowing them *their liberty* with the most, but taking *our own liberty* ever with the least.

There are many things which in my conscience are not absolutely and *in Thesi necessary* to be done; which yet *in Hypothesi* for some *personal respects* I think so fit for me to do, that I should resolve to undergo some inconveniency rather than *omit* them; still reserving *to others* their *liberty* to do as they should see cause. There are again many things which in my conscience are not absolutely and *in Thesi unlawful* to be done; which yet *in Hypothesi*, and for the like *personal respects*, I think so *unfit* for me to do, that I should resolve to undergo some inconvenience rather than *do* them: yet still reserving *to others* the like *liberty* as before, to do as they should see cause. It belongeth to every sober Christian advisedly to consider not onely what in it self may *lawfully* be done or left undone; but also what in *godly wisdom* and discretion is

fittest

fitteſt for him to do, or not to do upon all occaſions, as the exigence of *preſent Circumſtances* ſhall require.

And now you are willing I doubt not to hear how this exact man appeared in the world. You muſt know, that when he found his youthful heat abated and fined; his Parts and Abilities competent; his Underſtanding furniſhed with all neceſſary knowledge; his Memory made faithful and ſerviceable by method and deep apprehenſion; his Invention upon any ſubject flowing with proper Notions; his Judgement in a variety of Learning exact, and diſcerning things that differ; his Prudence for affairs mature and well weighed; and his Soul knit to a reſolution able to meet with variety of occaſions, with honour, quiet, pleaſure and ſafety: he was not wedded to eaſe and ſpeculation, nor wanting (what able men ſometimes do) a publick Patrociny and Encouragement, in anſwer to the expectation of the Univerſity that bred him, of his Generation that looked for him, and his own inclination,——who would always ſay, *That Employment was Improvement.* He left the Univerſity, having compaſſed with his knowledge the whole Circle of the Arts, being exact in propriety and elegancy of Languages, having read ancient and modern Writers; having ſtudied Philoſophy, and made himſelf familiar with all politer Claſſick Authors, being learned in School-Divinity, and a Maſter in Church-Antiquity, ready in the ſenſe of Scripture, Fathers, Councils, Eccleſiaſtical Hiſtory: "Thus full of Scripture-ſtrength, of "Councils

Sect. 6. *His removal from the Univerſity.*

" Councils weight, of Fathers consent, of Historick " light, of Scholastick acuteness; he, I say, left the University freely, making not the usual advantage of his place, which was then prudence and good husbandry, but looked upon by him as the worst Sacriledge in the *world*, as which at once betrayed the Church to the unworthy and weak, and the University to the undeserving, and the Founders Charity to those persons they never designed them for; to the shame of the present Age, and the undoing of the future; and betaking himself to his Charge at *Boothby-Pagnel* in *Lincoln*-shire, where we have him

Sect. 7. *His Preaching.*

Preaching solidly, not allowing himself the easie liberty of doing the work of the Lord negligently. Although he was furnished with that Classick and Authentick Learning, which readily enabled him to speak upon any occasion and subject properly, pertinently, copiously and handsomely; yet such was his reverence of that great work, that he was very elaborate and exact in reading, meditating and composing his Sermons to rational and just Discourses. His method was to chuse his Text *pertinently*; to weigh its occasion, coherence, and other circumstances, *duely*; to look out the truest reading of it, *industriously*; to open that Original by reading out of the choicest Authors, and most proper learning in that kinde, *clearly*; to drop such pithy and pertinent Observations, learned, moral, divine, as he went on in Explication, *judiciously*; to pitch upon great Observations that were couched in the several parts, *usefully*: which he deduced from

from the Text evidently, (for he could not endure thoſe that wreſted the Scripture for a truth, as men that were under a temptation of wreſting them for an errour) bottomed upon their proper Grounds and Reaſons orderly, (preſſing each truth with evidence raiſed from their ſeveral places in the body of Divinity) illuſtrated and enlarged with general Learning, and *improved* to the reſpective Duties of Chriſtianity that he ſaw might rationally be inferred from them: and indeed his general Learning afforded him plenty of Obſervations, proper, learned and uſeful, upon each head. His way, like Dr. *Hammond*, was after every Sermon to reſolve upon the enſuing ſubject, and to draw a Scheme of it, and to take in the courſe of his ſtudy what fell in conducible unto the preſent purpoſe; and he ſpoke from the heart to the heart.

As he provided ſtrong meat for ſtrong men, ſo he provided ſincere milk for babes, ſpending an hour at evening in the Church-Catechiſm, whereat the Parents and elder ſort were wont to be preſent, and from whence they reaped more benefit then from his Sermons; the great Principles of Religion working more powerfully upon them then his Diſcourſes and Enlargements. *Chriſtianity was moſt ſucceſsful*, he would ſay, *when propoſed naked and in its own evidence, as the truth was in Jeſus.* By Catechiſing, the Goſpel prevailed over Judaiſm and Heatheniſm; by Catechiſing, Popery incroached and broke in upon the Goſpel; by Catechiſing, the Goſpel again recovered it ſelf, and got ground of Popery. He opened the Church-

Catechism distinctly, grounded them in each point stedfastly, and taught them their duties arising out of each part of Religion profitably; making it appear as he went along, *how the grace of God bringing salvation by Jesus Christ hath appeared, teaching men to deny all ungodliness and wordly lust, and to live soberly, justly and godly in the present world.*

As he taught them, so he and they lived up to a Religion pure and undefiled: he and they joyning together in the holy Offices, 1. Of Common-prayer in all the days appointed, devoutly and reverently, (where he and his family was the great Rule and Pattern.) 2. Of the holy Sacrament carefully and preparedly, not without previous instructions and directions publick and private. 3. In an holy love and charity, which taught them successfully, being exemplary therein, and being able by his great skill in all Laws to compose all Differences in his private address and conversation: his Judgement being so esteemed, that there were few that knew him, but would stand to his prudent and honest Arbitration: wherein the God of love and peace so blessed him, that as he maintained love among others, so he had the love of all; there being not any of his function either more esteemed while alive, or more lamented when dead. Neither did he think it enough to perswade his people to an obligingness in Conversation, unless he could work them to a charity and hospitality, whereby they might endear themselves to each other, and relieve the poor. Among them he would be the most welcome: for he understood very

very well how much the Applications of the Table enforced the Doctrines of the Pulpit; and how subservient the endearing of his person was to the recommending of his instructions, where his elegant, apt and facetious way, sweetned his more serious discourse, and weighty conceptions: so that he was heard at once with the highest *pleasure* and *profit* in the world. As he urged their charity to the Poor earnestly, so he directed it discreetly, that the Idle partaked not of it: and truely the Needy had a stock raised for them, to employ and relieve them; I say, to employ and relieve them: for he had no charity for the Idle and the Vagrant,—— the very scabs, filth and vermine of a Commonwealth. I mean such as have *health*, and *strength*, and *limbs*, and are in some measure able to *work*, and take pains for their living, yet rather chuse to *wander* abroad the Country, and to spend their days in a most base and ungodly course of life; and, which is yet more lamentable, by I know not what connivence, contrary to all *Conscience*, *Equity*, and *Law*, are suffered. All Christian *Commonwealths* should be the *Israels* of God; and in his *Israel*, God, as he *promised* there should be some always *poor*, on whom to exercise charity; so he *ordained* there should be *no beggar*, to make a trade and profession of begging. *Plato*, than whom never any laid down a more exact *Idea* of an happy Commonwealth, allowed not any *beggar* therein; alledging, that where such were tolerated, it was impossible but the State must abound with *pilfering* and *whoring*, and all kinde of base villany. The

Civil Laws have flat Conſtitutions againſt them, in the Titles *de mendicantibus non invalidis*. But I think never kingdom had more wholeſome laws in both kinds, I mean both for the competent *relief* of *the orderly poor*, and for ſharp *reſtraint* of *diſorderly vagabonds*, then thoſe proviſions which in many of our own memories have been made in this land. But *Quid leges ſine moribus---?* Thoſe *Laws* are now *no Laws*, for want of due *execution*: but *Beggars* are *Beggars* ſtill, for want of due *correction*. *Et vetabitur ſemper, & retinebitur*; the ſaying is truer of *Rogues* and *Gypſies* in England, than ever it was of *Mathematicians* in Rome. You to whoſe care the preſervation of *the Juſtice*, and thereby alſo of *the Peace* of the Land is committed, as you tender *the Peace* and *Juſtice* of the Land, as you tender your own *quiet*, and *the ſafety* of your neighbours; as you tender *the weal* of your Country, and the honour of *God*: breath freſh life into the languiſhing *Laws* by ſevere *execution*; be rather *cruel* to theſe *Vipers*, than to *the State*. So ſhall you free *us* from *the Plague*, and *your ſelves* from *the guilt*, and *them* from *the opportunities*, of infinite ſinful abominations.

But we are unreaſonable to preſs you thus far, or to ſeek to you or any others for *Juſtice* in this matter; having power enough in our own hands to do our ſelves *Juſtice* upon theſe men, if we would but uſe it: Even by making a ſtrait Covenant with our *Ears*, not to *heed* them; and with our *Eyes*, not to *pity* them; and with our *Hands*, not to *relieve* them. Say I this altogether of my

ſelf

ſelf? or ſaith not the Apoſtle even the ſame? *He that will not labour, let him not eat:* relieve him not. But hath not Chriſt required us to *feed the hungry*, and to *cloath the naked*, and to be free and *charitable to the poor*? Nothing ſurer: God forbid any man ſhould preach againſt *Charity* and *Almſdeeds*. But remember, that as *God* approveth not *Alms* or any other work, if without *Charity*; ſo nor *Charity* it ſelf, if without *Diſcretion*. *Honour Widdows*, ſaith Saint *Paul*, *But thoſe that are Widdows indeed.* So relieve the *poor*, but relieve thoſe that are *poor indeed.* Not every one that *asketh*; not every one that *wanteth*; nay more, not every one that is *poor*, is *poor indeed*: and he that in his indiſcreet and miſ-guided charity ſhould give to every one that *asketh*, or *wanteth*, or is *poor*, meat, or clothing, or Alms; would ſoon make himſelf more *hungry*, and *naked*, and *poor*, than he that is moſt hungry, or naked, or poor. The *poor*, whom Chriſt commendeth to thee as a fit object for thy charity, *the poor indeed*, are thoſe that want, not onely *the things* they ask, but want alſo *means* to get without asking. A man that is *blind*, or *aged*, and paſt his *work*; a man that is *ſick*, or *weak*, or *lame*, and *cannot* work; a man that deſires it, and ſeeks it, and *cannot get* work; a man that hath *a greater charge* upon him than his honeſt pains can maintain; ſuch a man as one of theſe, he is *poor indeed.* Let thine *Ears* be open, and thine *Eyes* open, and thy *Bowels* open, and thy *Hands* open to ſuch a one: it is a charitable deed, and a *Sacrifice of ſweet ſmelling*; *with ſuch ſacrifices God is well pleaſed*: Forget not

thou

thou to offer ſuch *ſacrifices* upon every good opportunity, and be well aſſured God will not forget in due time to reward thee. But for a luſty able *upright man* (as they ſtile him in their own dialect) that had rather *begg*, or *ſteal*, or both, than *dig*; he is no more to be *relieved* as a *poor* man, than a woman that hath poyſoned her husband is to be *honoured* as a *Widow*. Such a woman is a *Widow*, for ſhe hath no more an husband than any other *Widow* hath: but ſuch a Woman is not *a Widow indeed*, as St. *Paul* would be underſtood; not ſuch *a Widow* as he would have honoured: it is alms to *hang* up ſuch a *Widow*, rather than to *honour* her. And I dare ſay, he that helpeth one of theſe *ſturdy Beggars* to the ſtocks, and the whip, and the houſe of correction, not only deſerveth better of *the Common-wealth*; but doth a work of greater *Charity* in the ſight of God, than he that helpeth him with *meat*, and *money*, and *lodging*. For he that doth this, corrupteth his *Charity* by a *double* errour. *Firſt*, he maintaineth, and ſo *encourageth* the other in *idleneſs*; who, if none would relieve him, would be glad to do any *work* rather then ſtarve. And, *Secondly*, he diſableth his *Charity*, by *miſ-placing it*; and unawares robbeth *the poor*, whilſt he thinketh he relieveth them. As he that giveth any *honour* to an *Idol*, robbeth *the true God*, to whom alone all *religious honour* is due: ſo he that giveth any *Alms* to an *idle beggar*, robbeth the truly *poor*, to whom properly all the fruits of our *Alms* are due. And ſo it cometh to paſs oftentimes (as Saint *Ambroſe* ſometimes complained) that the maintainance of *the poor* is made the ſpoil of the *loyterer*.

To

To maintain that peace and quiet, he endeavoured to keep every one within his own bounds, that none defraud and go beyond another: wishing them to have that one great Rule in their eye, *What ye would have others do unto you, that do ye unto them*: this is the Law and the Prophets. He would tell them, that the reason why he lived so peaceably with all his Neighbours, was, because he never received from any of them any more then he would willingly pay: the reason why he was so civil, he always looked upon his Parishioner as if he were the Minister, and upon himself the Minister as if he were the Parishioner.

Neither was he less obliging in his Carriage towards the Neighbouring Gentry, who were much taken with his great Reason, useful Observation, excellent Discourses, Civil, Moral, Philosophical, Historical, Technical: and indeed his skill in Architecture, Geography, Opticks, Geometry, Astronomy, Heraldry, in which he took great delight, much endeared him to his ingenious Neighbours, who in his company might communicate and improve their own. And indeed he observed it very requisite that Ministers should have a competent skill in History, Mathematicks, Law and Physick, to entertain the Ingenious, and to advise the Ignorant, *who expect that the Priests lips should preserve all knowledge, and that the people should receive it from their mouths.* Excellent was that advice of his: "As the times now are, wherein *Learning* a-"bounderh even unto *wantonness*, and wherein the "World is full of Questions, and Controversies,

"and

"and Novelties, and Niceties in *Religion*; and "wherein moſt of our *Gentry*, very *Women* and all, "(by the advantage of long *Peace*, and the cuſtoms "of modern *Education*, together with the help of a "multitude of *Engliſh books* and Tranſlations) are "able to look through the ignorance of a *Clergy-man*, and cenſure it, if he be tripping in any point "of *Hiſtory*, *Coſmography*, Moral or Natural *Philoſophy*, *Divinity*, or the *Arts*; yea, and to chaſtiſe "his very *method* and *phraſe*, if he ſpeak looſely, or "impertinently, or but improperly, and if every "thing be not *point-vize*. I ſay, as theſe times are, "I would not have a *Clergy-man* content himſelf "with every *Mediocrity* of gifts; but by his pray-"ers, care and induſtry improve thoſe he hath, ſo "as he may be able upon good occaſion to *impart* "*ſpiritual gifts* to the people of God, *whereby they* "*may be eſtabliſhed*, and to *ſpeak* with ſuch under-"ſtanding, and ſufficiency, and pertinency, (eſpe-"cially when he hath juſt *warning*, and a conveni-"ent time to prepare himſelf) in ſome good mea-"ſure of proportion to the quickneſs and ripeneſs "of theſe preſent times, as they that love not his "*Coat*, may yet approve his *Labours*, and not finde "any thing therein whereat juſtly to quarrel: "*Shewing in his Doctrine* (as our Apoſtle writeth to "*Titus*) *uncorruptneſs, gravity, ſincerity, ſound ſpeech* "*that cannot be condemned, that he that is of the con-*"*trary part may be aſhamed, having no evil to ſay of* "*him.*

He was always ſo excellent a Neighbour, that he ſeldome failed in the civility of Viſits and Cor-

Correſpondence; the greateſt advantages for good underſtanding and love: but eſpecially in time of ſickneſs, when affliction was an excellent preparative for inſtruction. Wherefore not onely when intreated, (as moſt of his dying Neighbours were unwilling to leave the world until he, good man, had ſetled their conſciences upon Goſpel-principles in peace with God) did he make his viſits to all ſuch as wanted his aſſiſtance; but before he was thought of, would he prevent their requeſts, by early and frequent addreſſes to them: attending diligently thoſe *mallia tempora*, thoſe gentle and moſt tractable opportunities of doing good which might be offered him.

As he was publick-ſpirited himſelf, ſo he endeavoured that all he had intereſt in, might be communicative; there being few Gentlemen of his acquaintance whom he had not directed to ſome noble or charitable work for mens improvement or relief: He, their great Caſuiſt, having their hearts and purſes at his devotion, and uſing his happy power always to their honour, comfort, and infinite ſatisfaction: ſo, he would ſay, he reſcued the Creature from the *bondage of corruption, to the glorious ſervice of God, and to Primitive innocence*, and their *firſt uſe*.

Although he was thus employed and taken up at his private charge, and pleaſed with his beloved privacy and retirement; yet when ſummoned to the Publick, as to *Paul*'s Croſs, to Viſitations, to Lectures, to the Court, to the Univerſity, he appeated with much zeal, prudence, and holy abi-

Sect. 8. *His Publike carriage.*

E lities,

lities, with elegant and useful performances, full of Dogmatick, Polemick, Practick, Casuistick and Critick Learning; where he offered the marrow and pith of the Fathers, the subtilty of the Schoolmen, the solidity of the Neotericks, so ready, so clear, so percolated from the Authors obscurity or tediousness, that his Quintessence, or Distillations of them in his Discourse, were more useful, perspicuous and vigorous, then the Originals or first Mass wherein they were diffused. At Visitations he offered deep, solid, clear and abstract Notions of Reason, Experience and Religion, for Order, Peace, Unity and Obedience, and pointed out those paths equally distant from superstition and licentiousness, wherein all wise and good Christians should walk in peace, according to the will of God declared in Laws Natural, Civil, Moral and Ecclesiastical; where the attentive Hearers admired equally the acute manner, and the weighty matter of his Discourses; his strong Arguments, his clear Deductions, his impartial Judgement, his steady, even, and undistracted Thoughts, whereby he rescued poor souls, whose easiness cast them on obvious errours, rather then they would search after difficult and retired truths. He perswaded private Reasons, Pretences, Interests and Designes, to yeild to publick Law and common good. He convinced the world that the things enjoyned in our Church, are in their nature safe and lawful, in their use free; and to be used in obedience to Authority, for order, decency and edification, as they might be forborn when not enjoyned,

joyned, or not conducing to order, decency, or a ſacred ſolemnity. He taught men to bring their conſciences to a Rule, and forbear nothing as againſt conſcience which was not againſt a Rule, againſt Gods Word, againſt Faith, or Manners, or the nature of the things enjoyned. How clearly hath he proved, that as all neceſſaries were enjoyned by expreſs Scriptures; ſo all the Circumſtances of Worſhip and Diſcipline were enjoyned in Scripture-*intimations*; which required all things *orderly* and *decent*? How pathetically would he urge, that Publick Authority knew better what Time, Place, Geſture, Garment, Phraſe, Rite or Ceremony was moſt expedient and orderly, then any private Spirit; and that if any man would be contentious, *we had no ſuch cuſtome, nor the Churches of God*? How powerfully would he urge a Compliance with Publick Authority, to avoid ſcandal, to teſtifie our Charity, Humility and Obedience; to ſhew our Reverence and fear of it; to uſe our Chriſtian Liberty ſoberly, charitably and obediently; that Laws might be obſerved, the Church might be compoſed, Charity might be revived, Dangers might be avoided, the Kingdome might be ſetled, good Chriſtians might be edified, God might be obeyed, and our Superiours for Gods ſake? Thus he ſtudied, debated, cleared and compoſed Differences; thus he ſatisfied Scruples; thus he juſtified the Churches Liberty and Authority: the care of which ſo entirely poſſeſſed him, that he reduced moſt of his ſtudy to that deſigne; which he managed with plenty of Matter, with variety of

Reading, with full and pertinent Citations, with clear and copious Expreſſions, methodical Proceedings, powerful Demonſtrations, Fundamental Reaſon, Original Law, Eſſential Religion, with a prudent diſcovery of the proportions of order and policy, of the boundaries of Government, and the great principles of peace. And all this was the better taken, becauſe taught by a man not onely of vaſt and great Abilities, of full maturity of Judgement; but of great Integrity in his Deſigne, of great innocency and unblameableneſs in his Converſation; of a good Conſcience; of a great calmneſs and compoſure in Spirit; of a vaſt Comprehenſion, who ſtrained the Quinteſſence of Reaſon, Religion, Laws Grecian, Roman, Imperial, and Civil, Canon and Eccleſiaſtical, to his great Platform for Peace, Unity and Setlement.

Sect. 9. *At Court and Lectures.*

At Court, and in his Lectures, he purſued the moſt neceſſary Duties, and the moſt concerning Caſes of Conſcience: for he obſerved, That it is one *Stratagem* of the Arch-enemy of mankind, (and when we know his *wiles*, we may the better be able to *defeat* him) by buſying men of great and uſeful parts in *by-matters*, and things of leſſer conſequence, to divert them from following that *unum neceſſarium*, that which ſhould be the main in all our endeavours, the beating down of *ſin*, the planting of *Faith*, and the reformation of *manners*. *Controverſies*, I confeſs, are neceſſary, *the Tongues* neceſſary, *Hiſtories* neceſſary, *Philoſophy* and *The Arts* neceſſary, other *Knowledge* of all ſorts neceſſary in the Church; for *Truth* muſt be maintained, *Scripture*-

ture-phraſes opened, *Hereſie* confuted, the mouths of *Adverſaries* ſtopped, *Schiſms* and *Novelties* ſuppreſſed: But when all is done, *poſitive* and *Practique Divinity* is it muſt bring us to Heaven: that is it muſt poiſe our *judgements*, ſettle our *conſciences*, direct our *lives*, mortifie our *corruptions*, increaſe our *graces*, ſtrengthen our *comforts*, ſave our *ſouls*. *Hoc opus, hoc ſtudium:* there is no *ſtudy* to this, none ſo well worth the labour as this, none that can bring ſo much *profit* to others, nor therefore ſo much *glory* to God, nor therefore ſo much *comfort* to our own hearts, as this. *This is a faithful ſaying, and theſe things I will that thou affirm conſtantly* (ſaith St. *Paul* to *Titus*) *that they which have believed in God might be careful to maintain good works: theſe things are good and profitable unto men.* You cannot do more *good* unto the Church of God, you cannot more *profit* the people of God, by your *gifts*; then by preſſing effectually theſe two great points, *Faith*, and *good works*. Theſe are good and profitable unto men.

Inſomuch that the excellent King would ſay, I bring an ear *to hear others*; I bring a conſcience to hear *Sanderſon*. And the throng of Auditors in Court and Country was ſo fixed and attentive upon the deep, rational, and knowing Emanations of his ſoul, as if they expected new Rules of Life from that great Searcher of Rules and Laws. His great care was, ſo to direct his Heart, his Tongue, his Endeavour in the exerciſe of his Miniſtry, both publick and private, that by Gods bleſſing upon his Labours, he might be enabled to advance Gods

glory,

glory, to promote his truth, to benefit his Church, to propagate all Christian Duties, to discharge a good conscience in the mean time; and at the last, make his account with comfort at the appearing of the Lord Jesus Christ.

Sect. 10. *At Convocations.*

From the year 1624. to his death, there was no Convocation, or Assembly, or Treaties, but he was called to, as a man of deep Observation in the publick defects of the Church; of great prudence in applying remedies suitable to those defects, in the fear of God and love of his truth, so as became a man of Learning, Gravity, and a good Conscience, in so grand Concernments as imported the peace of the Church, the satisfaction and salvation of mens souls. For which Meetings he prepared himself by a view of all Judgements in the Controversies there likely to be debated, which he drew up into Tables still to be seen, that he might try all things, and hold fast that which is good. Where-ever he appeared, whether in the School, or in Convocation, or in a Committee, (as at the Dean of *Westminster*, *March* 21. 1640.) his moderation was known unto all men;

1. In those five Points controverted so much in *England* as well as *Holland*, of, 1. Predestination; 2. Reprobation; 3. Universal Redemption; 4. Effectual Grace; and, 5. Perseverance: he pitched upon such a mean as Bishop *Usher*, Bishop *Davenant*, Bishop *Overal* aimed at, and the excellent Dr. *Hammond* approved of, as appears in his Letters of Accord with that incomparable Doctor.

2. As

2. As to the Popiſh Controverſies and Adverſaries, he had ſo far pity and charity for thoſe plain and honeſt-hearted people of that way, as either their errours or ignorance in ſome things not fundamental, did not betray them either to unbelief or preſumption, or to final impenitency, or immorality, or uncharitableneſs. He was herein of Biſhop *Uſher*'s minde, in his Sermon before King *James* an *Wanſted.*

3. As to our Reformation: he had a great eſteem for the Moderation of it, a great Veneration for the Inſtruments employed of God in it, and a great love of that wholſome way of Doctrine, Life, Devotion and Government then compoſed: not that he was ſuch a Formaliſt, but that he wiſhed an alteration of ſome Words, Phraſes, and Method and Order, to which change of times, or Language, or the like, might *invite*; though he judged all alterations in ſuch grand and eſtabliſhed Concerns of Religion, ſhould be done by the publick Spirit, Counſel and Conſent of the Prophets, Prince and People.

4. As to Conformity to the Church, although no man more eminent then he for Orthodox Divinity, and orderly Conformity, yet if any out of ſcruple or tenderneſs of conſcience was leſs ſatisfied with ſome things, no man had a more tender heart to pity and pray for them; none had a gentler and more powerful way to win and perſwade thoſe that were capable, ingenious and honeſt. Indeed he would ſay as Biſhop *Brownrig*, That *nothing was leſs to be ſtickled for or againſt*, *then*

then *Ceremonies*; and yet that nothing was to be ſtickled for more then Obedience to Governours enjoyning even the ſmalleſt Ceremonies: not for the worth of the Ceremony, but for the Obedience due to Authority for conſcience ſake.

5. In the buſineſs of Church-government, as he was too knowing to queſtion, ſo he was too honeſt to deny the univerſal Cuſtoms and Practice of the Church of Chriſt, in all ages and places for 1500 years for Epiſcopacie; yet was he paſſionately inclined to any fair and fraternal accommodation, that humble, orderly and worthy Miniſters might have all their, and Biſhops no more than was their due by Scripture, primitive Cuſtoms, by the Laws of the Land, and by principles of order and true government among all ſocieties of men. As his demonſtrations for Epiſcopacie were potent, his perſwaſions pathetick: ſo his deſigns were upright and juſt; his deportment ſo fatherly and friendly, that he was able to reclaim all rational, ſober and honeſt men.

Sect. 11. *His Conſtancie and Patience.*

In all revolutions, as he had eſpouſed principles conſtant to truth and duty, ſo he ſtood firm to his principles, as a judicious and conſcientious man, as a wiſe and honeſt man, where he ſaw Scripture and Law tyed him up: bearing up with his great abilities againſt the ſtream, while Reaſon could be heard; and afterward retyring within himſelf, and wrapping himſelf in innocence and patience: more affected with the publick ſins and miſeries, than his own ſuffering: Alwayes as cheerful as one that had the continual feaſt of a good conſcience

ſcience, *and the happineſs to learn in what ſtate ſoever he was, therewithall to be contented*, and to know how patiently to *want*, and how wiſely and ſoberly to *abound*.

Nothing troubled him more, than that he was layd aſide and made uſeleſs, when a whole Nation deſired to imploy him, and many eminent Perſons (as the Honorable Mr. *Boyle*, 1659) endeavoured by all means to contrive a way, wherein he might communicate his excellent notions to the world. He was a man of whom the world was not worthy: How willing were men to have more of that man, who had compoſed ſo many excellent Sermons as they read? who had written thoſe judicious pieces *De juramento & de obligatione Conſcientiæ* which they enjoyed? who had penned the Satisfactory Reaſon and Judgement of the Univerſity of *Oxford* againſt the Covenant, which they peruſed? who attained that exactneſs in controverſies, which in the Letters of accord to Dr. *Hammond* they obſerved? What reaſon would have *ſuppreſſed* this *worth*? What people would have *deprived* this man? What Government would have laid aſide ſo much reaſon, judgement and moſt uſeful Learning?

As he went through all conditions prudently, patiently, faithfully and honourably: ſo he fulfilled all relations conſcientiouſly. 1, He was a good, faithful, tender and loving, diſcreet husband, as I take it, of one Wife, with whom he lived ſome years comfortably, to whom he intruſted his Houſhold-affairs intirely; whom he troubled

not with unneceſſary buſineſs above her capacity. "He was more for an honourable Marriage, then "ſuch an affected Cœlibacy, as was leſs conſiſtent "with ſanctity, and leſs able to bear off thoſe houſhold-cares and other intercurrent troubles, which a Miniſters condition and charge brings with it. 2, He was a good father, prudent and indulgent to his children, exemplary before them: conſtantly recommending love and amity to them; and wiſely diſpoſing them according to their capacities and tempers, and devoting them to God: and giving them his bleſſing, and ſcattering among them excellent rules of living and dying. 3, He was a provident, careful, tender and diſcreet Maſter, directing each Servant to his peculiar advantage in his ſervice; reckoning nothing ſo much his honour, as Gods bleſſing upon his thriving Servants. 4, He was a moſt excellent friend, punctual, honeſt, uſeful, and communicative. 5, He was a Loyal Subject, by no conſiderations to be moved from his dutiful reſpects of fidelity, gratitude, love and obedience due to his Soveraign from him, as a Chriſtian, and a Church-man; he denyed any capacity in Chriſtian Subjects to reſiſt thoſe in authority, under any pretence whatſoever, there being a neceſſity for obeying, in doing, or ſuffering for conſcience ſake, as he expreſſeth himſelf honeſtly and rationally in his preface to Biſhop *Ushers* Book of *Power and Obedience*.

He was made Biſhop by his Majeſties gracious favour, with the univerſal vote of all good men,

anno

anno 1660. as who expected, his Prudence, Counſel, Equanimity and Moderation equal with his other Abilities, might allay Animoſities, cloſe Differences, heal mens Diſtempers, and work a right Underſtanding; all men imagining his Gravity might awe, his Goodneſs oblige, his Moderation temper, his Reaſon perſwade, and his approved Sincerity prevail upon all men *otherwiſe minded:* for he was not onely (as I told you) a man of much *Learning* and *Reading*, but of a *mature Underſtanding*, and a *mellow Judgement* in all matters Politick and Prudential, both Eccleſiaſtical and Civil. Inſomuch that it was thought, if his excellent temper had ſooner been added as an allay to ſome other mens hotteſt ſpirits, poſſibly we had not ſeen things run to that diſorder and ruine; his Gravity and Diſcretion being likely to allay and fix the Clergy to a due temperament, (guiding ſome mens well-meaning Zeal by ſuch Rules of Moderation as might beſt preſerve the Government and Conſtitution of this Church and Kingdome.)

In this place he ſetled himſelf more to comply with the publick good, then his own inclinations: looking up to him who called him to the Office of a Biſhop, that great and good work, for direction and aſſiſtance in all the intricate Affairs that were before him.

1. He had this advantage of other men, that when he entred upon that employment which lay open to the envy and malice of ſo many, that his *Life* was ſo ſpotleſs, his *Integrity* ſo eminent, that Partiality it ſelf could not accuſe him; he being a

man of ſolid worth, in whom was nothing dubious or dark, nothing various or inconſtant, nothing formal or affected; nothing as to his publick carriage that was ſuſpected, nothing that needed *palliation* or apologie. I never heard of any thing ſaid or done by him, which a wiſe and good man would have wiſhed not ſaid, or undone. As *Diogenes* confuted him who allowed not motion, by ſaying nothing, but walking before his eyes: ſo this excellent perſon neglected the ſuggeſtions of people diſaffected againſt his Order, but walked warily and circumſpectly in his Calling, really ſhaming thoſe Cavils by his Converſation.

His greatneſs prejudiced not his humility and diligence: the meaneſt Miniſter had free acceſs to him: the meaneſt ſervice had ſome time allotted to it: *Evangelizavit manu & Scriptione*; by his inſtruction, teaching the Clergy to preach; by his inſtruction, teaching the Laity to live. Hereby he governed hearts, ruling the Church as Chriſt himſelf by the Word, and making men yeild him a true and willing Obedience, reverencing God in him.

Painful, pious and peaceable Miniſters, throughout his Viſitation, were his chief Favourites: he looked them out of their retirements, to bring them to employment and preferment. He very diſcreetly beſtowed the Incouragements he had in his Dioceſs, on perſons of moſt reputed piety, ſufficiency and uſefulneſs.

As he was very careful to prefer good men that he found in Orders, ſo he was as careful to admit

none

none but good men to Orders; leſt, as he would ſay, he ſhould have reaſon (with him who made a dangerous man Prieſt) to wiſh he had laid his hands rather *on the Briers then on ſuch a mans head.* For their Parts, he truſted onely his own Judgement; for their Converſation, he truſted ſuch men of known integrity, as gave their Teſtimonials not out of courteſie but conſcience: and he would ſay, "That whoſoever gives a Certificate, enters into "bonds with God and the Church, under a heavy "forfeiture to avouch the honeſty of the party re- "commended; and, as *Judah* for *Benjamin*, they "become *ſureties for the young man to his father.* Nor "let them (as one ſaith) think to avoid the bond, "and make it but a blank, with that clauſe, *So far "forth as we know*; for what ſaith the Apoſtle? "*God is not mocked.*

He was careful and happy in ſuppreſſing the innovations he met with in Doctrine and Diſcipline; mildly winning men, rather then ſeverely puniſhing them: ſuch Offenders as were unhappy in deſerving, were yet happy in doing penance in his preſence; who aimed not at their ſuffering, but inſtruction; who would not have them undone, but reclaimed and reformed: and when he was ſevereſt to the *fault*, he made it appear he was kind to the *man*.

Church-cenſures of, 1. Admonition, 2. Excommunication, 3. Aggravation, 4. Penance, 5. Abſolution, were by him ſeriouſly and ſolemnly uſed, with great reverence, and on great occaſions, that they might be reſtored to the Primitive eſteem and veneration.

He

He employed his power wholly in Church-affairs, medling as little as he could with Affairs of State: not that he was unable to manage them, but that he thought them unworthy to be managed by him: onely he would endeavour a good understanding between Prince and People: yet he rather admired then condemned such reverend and able persons, who are strengthned with that which would distract him; making the concurrence of Civil and Temporal power in themselves, support one another.

Thus this good man was, in my judgement, the *Idea* of an excellent Prelate; coming up exactly to that excellent character of a Bishop, as one among men the most sober, among Christians the most religious, among Preachers the most exact, among Scholars the most useful, among Ministers the most faithful, among Governours the most moderate, among Martyrs the most patient and constant; who when he had discharged his conscience honestly, served his Prince successfully, assisted the Church industriously, gone through all charges renownedly, leaving nothing behind him justly to be blamed, or sinisterly to be suspected, but all things deservedly commended by wise and sober Christians, bequeathing to Posterity Principles of Government clearly stated and rationally expressed, with the general sorrow of the Church, but his own great satisfaction, was taken away with an happy *Euthanasia*, composedly, peaceably and comfortably departing, giving himself to Prayers, Medi-

Meditations, and Diſcourſes, which his own ſtrength could bear, or others kindneſs could reaſonably afford him, full of the grace and peace of God, and confirmed (as Dr. *Reynolds*, &c.) by the Abſolution of the Church, (which belongs to all that die in the true Faith, and bleſſed hope of penitent ſinners) he calmly rendred his holy, devout and precious ſoul to God that gave it, in a time when, with Biſhop *Bancroft*, he could ſay, *Eo temporis occubui quò mallem rationem Epiſcopatus coràm Deo dare, quam Epiſcopatum coram hominibus exercere.*

Quis damnaverit eam qui duabus potentiſſimis rebus defenditur jure & mente.——Quint.

And thus, *Sir*, if I have done nothing elſe, I have made it appear that I am ſo much at your devotion, that I chuſe rather to expoſe my ſelf, then diſpleaſe you; and venture at theſe few Remarques of this admirable perſon, rather then refuſe a compliance with you in what would be ſuch ſatisfaction to you, and ſuch advantage (as you ſay) to the Publick: eſpecially conſidering that publick good was the great deſigne of this worthy Biſhops both Preaching and Living, VVriting and Government.

I could wiſh I were able to pay my reverence to his great Vertues in publiſhing them to the world: In the mean time, devoting to your delight this imperfect, yet affectionate and well-meant Account of that great Learning and Prudence, Judgement and

and Zeal, Sincerity and Integrity, Humility and Charity, Conscience and Exactness, which are worthy of all mens imitation, and shall be my great pattern by Gods assistance; by whose grace if I may live what I have writ, I have attained what is the serious and just ambition of

Your most humble

Servant

D. F.

Bishop *Sanderson.*

Two things I have always had in my Care, *TRUTH* and *PERSPICUITY*: (for whereunto else serveth that Δυναμὶς ἑρμηνευτικὴ, wherewith God endued man, but to *speak Reason*, and *be understood?*)

King *Charles.*

I bring my *EAR* to hear others, I bring my *CONSCIENCE* to hear *Sanderson.*

Biſhop Sanderſon HIS JUDGMENT IN ONE VIEW FOR THE SETLEMENT OF THE CHURCH.

QUeſt. *How far we may Indulge good and godly men of tender conſciences diſſenting from us in liberty of Conſcience.*

Anſw. Firſt, beſides that *all parties* pretend to *Godlineſs*; *Papiſts*, *Anabaptiſts*, and what not? (even the late-ſprung-up generation of *Levellers*, whoſe *Principles* are ſo deſtructive of all that *Order* and *Juſtice* by which *publick ſocieties* are ſupported, do yet ſtyle themſelves, as by a kinde of peculiarity, *The Godly*;) And that *ſecondly*, it is the eaſyeſt thing in the world, and nothing more

common then for men to pretend *Conſcience*, when they are not minded to *obey*: I do not believe *thirdly*, (though I am well perſwaded of *the godlineſs* of many of them otherwiſe,) that *the refuſal* of indifferent *Ceremonies* enjoyned by *Lawful Authority*, is any part of their *Godlineſs*; or any good fruit, evidence, or ſign thereof. But certain it is *fourthly*, that *the godlieſt* men are *men*, and *know but in part*; and by the power of *godlineſs* in their *hearts*, are no more ſecured from the poſſibility of falling into *Errour* through *Ignorance*, then from the poſſibility of falling into Sin through *Infirmity*. And as for *Tenderneſs* of Conſcience *fifthly*, a moſt gracious bleſſed fruit of *the holy Spirit* of God, where it is *really*, and not *in pretence* only, nor *miſtaken*, (for ſure it is no very *tender Conſcience*, though ſometimes called ſo, that *ſtraineth at a Gnat, and ſwalloweth a Camel*:) it is with it, as with other *tender* things; very ſubject to receive *harme*, and ſoon put out of *order*. Through the cunning of *Satan*, it dangerouſly *expoſeth* men to *temptations on the right hand*: and through its own aptitude to entertain and to cheriſh *unneceſſary ſcruples*, it ſtrongly *diſpoſeth* them to *liſten* thereunto ſo long, till at the laſt they are *overcome* thereof. Needful it is therefore, that in the publick teaching *the Errours* ſhould be ſometimes refuted, and *the Temptations* diſcovered: And this ever to be done *ſeaſonably*, *ſoberly*, *diſcreetly*, and *convincingly*; and when we are to deal with men whoſe *Conſciences* are (ſo far as we can diſcern) truly *tender*, with

with the ſpirit of *meekneſs* and *Compaſſion*. For *tender* things muſt be *tenderly* dealt withall, or they are loſt. I know it is not allwayes *ſo done*: nor can we expect it ſhould. All *preachers* are neither ſo *charitable*, nor ſo *prudent*, not ſo *conſcientious* as they ſhould be: And they that are ſuch in a good meaſure, are *men* ſtill; and may be *tranſported* now and then through *paſſion*, and *infirmity*, beyond the juſt bounds of *moderation*.

Queſt. *Whether good men ſhould be ſuſpended from the exerciſe of their miniſtry, and deprived of their livelyhood, which are on all hands acknowledged indifferent: and indeed in compariſon to the work of the miniſtry are but trifles, however ſome men dote on them.*

Anſw. Let *Ceremonies* (*ſecondly*) be as very *Trifles*, as any man can imagine them to be; yet *Obedience* ſure is no *Trifle*. They miſ-ſtate *the Queſtion*, when they talke of preſſing *Ceremonies*. It is *Obedience* (formally) that is required: *Ceremonies* not otherwiſe preſſed, then as *the matter* wherein that *Obedience* is to be exerciſed. If a *maſter* appoint his *ſervant* to do ſome ſmall matter that he thinketh fit to have done, though in it ſelfe of no great moment; yet he will expect to be *obeyed*: and it is great reaſon he ſhould. If in ſuch caſe *the ſervant* ſhould *refuſe* to do the thing appointed, becauſe he hath *no minde* thereunto; and ſhould receive a check or correction for ſuch refuſal: could he either ſufficiently *excuſe* his own *fault*, or reaſonably *complain* of his *maſter* for deal-

ling hardly with him, by saying the thing was but *a Trifle*? Is it not evident, that the thing which made *the master* angry, and *the Servant* an offender in *that case*, was not (*precisely* and *formally*) the leaving of the thing *undone*, (which had it not been *commanded*, might have been left *undone* without any *fault* or *blame* at all;) but *the refusing* to do it, when he that had *a right* to his service *commanded* him? Wherefore *Thirdly*, that which is said of some mens *doting* so extreamely on *Ceremonies*, might have been well enough spared. I know no true son of *the Church of England*, that doteth upon any *Ceremony*, whatsoever opinion he may have of *the decency* or *expediency* of some of them. If any do; let him *answer* for himself. Among wise men, he will hardly pass for a *wise man*, that *doteth* upon any. Nor will he, I doubt, prove a much *wiser man*, that runs into *the contrary* extream, and *abhorreth* all. It is true *Fourthly*, that there have been long and *unkinde quarrels* about these things; More is *the pitty*! but where is *the fault*? To whom is *the beginning*, and to whom *the continuance* of a quarrel rather imputable? to him, that *demandeth* his right? or to him that *with-hōldeth* it from him? For this is the plain *Case* in short: *The Bishops* (*under the King*) require *obedience* to the *Lawes Ecclesiastical*; these men *refuse* to give it. So *began the quarrel* at first; and upon the same terms it *continued*. If the *Obedience* challenged were indeed due to these Laws; then did our *Brethren* both *begin* the quarrel, and *hold it on*: if it were not, then

must

muſt the whole *blame* lie upon them that *claimed it unjuſtly*, and not upon them. So that in the winding up of the buſineſs, the whole *Controverſie* will devolve upon this point; Whether to the *Laws Eccleſiaſtical* obedience be due or not? For the right determining whereof, (for ſo much as it is confeſt on all hands, that *Obediedce* is due to *Lawful authority* commanding *lawful things*) *two* other *points* are to be reſolved; the one concerning *the authority* by which the Conſtitutions were made; the other concerning *the lawfulueſs* of the things therein required; *The Presbyterians of the Kirk* flatly and directly deny both: *Ours*, leſs forward to declare their opinion in *the former* point, have choſen rather to ſtand upon *the latter* only. And ſo *the point in iſſue* is briefly this; Whether *the things* commanded (and particularly the *Ceremonies*) be *lawful*, yea, or no.

When for *decency*, *order*, or *uniformity's* ſake any *conſtitutions* are made concerning *ceremonies*, there is the ſame *neceſſity* of obeying ſuch *Conſtitutions*, as there is of obeying other *lawes* made for the good of *the Common-wealth* concerning any other *indifferent* things. That ſuch *neceſſity*, either in the one or the other, ariſeth not properly from *the authority* of the immediate *Lawgiver*; but from *the Ordinance of God*, who hath commanded us to obey *the ordinance of men* for his ſake. That ſuch *neceſſity of obedience* notwithſtanding, *the things* remain in the ſame *indifferency* as before; Every way in reſpect of their Nature, and *quoad Rem*,

(it being not in the power of *accidental relations* to change *the natures* of things:) and even in respect of their *Use*, and *quoad nos*, thus far, that there is *a liberty* left for men, upon extraordinary and other just occasions, sometimes to do otherwise then the Constitution requireth, *extra casum Scandali & Contemptus*: *A liberty*, which we dare not either take our selves, or allow to others, in things properly and absolutely necessary: Upon which very account (I mean the consideration of the indifferency of the things in themselves) and upon which account alone it is, that many of the Episcopal (that is to say, the true English Protestant) Divines, who sadly resent the voting down of the Liturgy, Festivals, and Ceremonies of the Church by so many former Laws established, heartily desired heretofore the continuance, and as heartily still wish the restitution, and are (by Gods help) ready with their Tongues, Pens and Sufferings to maintain and justifie the Lawful use of the same: do yet so far yield to the sway of the times, and are perswaded they may with a good Conscience so do, as to forbear the use thereof in the publick worship; till it shall seem good to those that are in place of authority either to restore them to their former state (as it is well hoped, when they shall have duly considered the evil consequents of that Vote, they will,) or at leastwise and in the mean time to leave them arbitrary, for men, according to their several different judgements, to use or not to use, which seemeth but

reason-

reasonable, the like favour and liberty in other kinds having been long allowed to almost all other sorts of men, though of never so distant persuasions one from another. Lastly, That all *Laws* made concerning *Ceremonies* or other *indifferent* things, whether *Civil* or *Ecclesiastical*, are *mutable*: and as they were at first made *by humane authority*, so may they from time to time be *by humane authority* abrogated and repealed. And then and thenceforth they lose their *obligation*: whereby *the necessity* of yielding *obedience* thereunto wholy ceaseth and determineth; and *the things* thereby *commanded* or *prohibited*, return to their primitive and natural *indifferency*, even in their *Use* also, and *in respect of us*.

But in the Case of our Church now it is far otherwise. *Cap*, *Surplice*, *Cross*, *Ring* and other *Ceremonies*, which are the Matter of our differences, though they be things *indifferent* for their *nature*, and *in themselves*: yet are not so for their *use*, and *unto us*. If *the Church* had been silent, if *Authority* had prescribed nothing herein, these *Ceremonies* had then remained for their *use*, as they are for their *nature*, indifferent: *Lawful*, and such as might be *used* without sin; and yet *Arbitrary*, and such as might be also *forborn* without sin. But men must grant (though they be unwilling, if yet they will be reasonable) that every *particular Church* hath power for *decency an orders* sake, to ordain and constitute *ceremonies*. Which being once ordained, and by publick authority enjoyned, cease to be

indifferent

indifferent for their *use*, though they remain still so for their *nature*: and of *indifferent* become so *necessary*, that neither may a man without sin *refuse* them, where Authority requireth; nor *use* them, where Authority restraineth the use.

Neither is this accession of *Necessity* any impeachment to *Christian Liberty*; or *insnaring* of mens *consciences* as some have objected. For then do we ensnare mens consciences by *humane constitutions*, where we thrust them upon men as if they were *divine*; and bind mens consciences to them *immediately*, as if they were immediate parts of *Gods worship*, or of absolute necessity unto salvation. This *Tyranny* and *Usurpation* over mens Consciences, *the Pharisees* of old did, and *the Church of Rome* at this day doth exercise, and we justly hate in her, equalling, if not preferring her *Constitutions* to the *Laws* of GOD. But our *Church* (GOD be thanked) is far from any such impious presumption: and hath sufficiently *declared* her self by solemn *protestation*, enough to satisfie any ingenuous impartial judgement, that by requiring obedience to these *ceremonial constitutions*, she hath no other purpose, then to reduce all *her children* to an *orderly conformity* in the *outward worship* of God; so far is she from seeking to draw any opinion, either of *divine necessity* upon the *constitution*, or of *effectual holiness* upon the *ceremony*. And as for the prejudice which seemeth to be hereby given to *Christian liberty*, it is so slender a conceit, that it seemeth to bewray in the objectors a desire, not so much of *satisfaction*,

ſatisfaction, as *cavil*. For *firſt*, the liberty of a Chriſtian to all indifferent things, is in *the Mind* and *Conſcience*: and is then infringed, when *the Conſcience* is bonnd and ſtrained, by imposing upon it an opinion of *doctrinal Neceſſity*. But it is no wrong to *the Liberty* of a Chriſtian mans conſcience, to bind him to *outward obſervation* for *Orders* ſake; and to impoſe upon him *a neceſſity of Obedience*. Which one diſtinction of *Doctrinal* and *Obediential Neceſſity* well weighed, and rightly applyed, is of it ſelf ſufficient to clear all doubts in this point. For, to make all *reſtraint* of the outward man in matters *indifferent* an impeachment of *Chriſtian liberty*; what were it elſe, but even to bring flat *Anabaptiſme* and *Anarchy* into the Church? and to overthrow all bond to *ſubjection* and *obedince* to lawful authority? I beſeech you conſider, wherein can *the immediate power* and authority of *Fathers*, *Maſters*, and other *Rulers* over their inferiours conſiſt; or the due *obedience* of inferiours be ſhewn towards them: if not in theſe *indifferent* and *Arbitrary* things? For, things *abſolutely neceſſary*, as commanded by God, we are bound *to do*; whether humane Authority *require* them, or no: and things *abſolutely Unlawful*, as prohibited by God, we are bound *not to do*; whether humane Authority *forbid* them, or no. There are none other things left then, wherein to expreſs properly *the Obedience* due to ſuperiour Authority, then theſe *Indifferent things*. And if a *Father* or *Maſter* have power to prescribe to his *Child* or *Servant* in indifferent

things; and such restraint be no way prejudicial to *Christian liberty* in them: Why should any man, either deny the like power to *Church-Governours*, to make *Ecclesiastical-constitutions* concerning indifferent things? or interpret that power to the prejudice of *Christian Liberty*? And again *Secondly*, Men must understand, that it is an errour to think *Ceremonies* and *constitutions* to be things *merely in different*: I mean in the general. For howsoever every *particular Ceremony* be indifferent; and every *particular constitution* arbitrary and alterable; yet that there should be some *Ceremonies*, it is necessary *Necessitate absoluta*, in as much as no outward work can be performed without *Ceremonial* circumstances, some or other: and that there should be some *Constitutions* concerning them, it is also necessary (though not simply and absolutely, as the former; yet *ex hypothesi*, and) *necessitate convenientiæ*. Otherwise, since some *Ceremonies* must needs be used; every *Parish*, nay every *man* would have his own fashion by himself, as his humour led him: whereof what other could be the issue, but infinite *distraction*, and unorderly *confusion* in the Church? And again *thirdly*, to return their weapon upon themselves; If every restraint in *indifferent things* be injurious to *Christian liberty*: then themselves are injurious no less by their *negative* restraint from some Ceremonies, *Wear not*, *Cross not*, *Kneel not*, &c. then they would have the world believe our Church is by her positive *restraint* unto these Ceremonies of *wearing*, and *crossing*, and *kneeling*, &c.

Let

Let indifferent men judge, nay let themſelves that are parties judge, whether is more injurious to Chriſtian Liberty; *publick Authority* by mature advice commanding, what might be forborn: or *private ſpirits* through humorous diſlikes, forbidding what may be uſed: the *whole Church* impoſing the *uſe*, or a *few Brethren* requiring the *forbearance* of ſuch things, as are otherwiſe and in themſelves equally *indifferent* for uſe, or for forbearance.

But they ſay, *our Church* makes greater matters of *Ceremonies* than thus; and preferreth them even before the moſt *neceſſary duties* of preaching & adminiſtring *the Sacraments*: in as much as they are impoſed upon *miniſters* under pain of *Suſpenſion* and *Deprivation* from their Miniſterial *Functions* and *Charges*. Firſt, for actual Deprivation; I take it, unconforming Miniſters have no great cauſe to complain. "Our Church, it is well known, hath "not alwayes uſed that rigour ſhe might have "done. Where ſhe hath been forced to proceed "as far as *deprivation*! ſhe hath *ordinarily* by her "fair, and ſlow, and compaſſionate proceeding "therein, ſufficiently manifeſted her unwillingneſs "thereto: and declared her ſelf a Mother every way indulgent enought to ſuch ill-nurtured Children, as will not be ruled by her. *Secondly*, thoſe that are *ſuſpended* or *deprived*; ſuffer it but juſtly for their *obſtinacy* and *contempt*. For howſoever they would bear the world in hand, that they are *the only perſecuted ones*, and that they ſuffer for their *conſciences*: yet in truth, they do but abuſe

the credulity of the ſimple therein; and herein (as in many other things) jump with the *Papiſts*, whom they would ſeem above all others moſt abhorrent from. For as *Seminary Prieſts* and *Jeſuits* give it out that they ſuffer for *Religion*; when the very truth is, they are juſtly executed for their prodigious *Treaſons*, and felonious or teacherous *practiſes* againſt lawful Princes & Eſtates: So *the brethren* pretend they are *perſecuted* for their *conſciences*; when they are indeed but juſtly *cenſured* for their obſtinate and pertinacious *contempt* of lawful authority. For it is not *the refuſal* of theſe *Ceremonies* they are deprived for, otherwiſe then as *the matter* wherein they ſhew their *contempt*: it is *the contempt* it ſelf, which *formerly* and properly ſubjecteth them to juſt *Eccleſiaſtical cenſure* of Suſpenſion or Deprivation. And *contempt of authority*, though in the ſmalleſt matter deſerveth no ſmal puniſhment: all *authority* having been ever ſollicious (as it hath good reaſon) above all things to vindicate and preſerve it ſelf from *contempt*; by inflicting ſharp puniſhments upon *contemptuous* perſons in *the ſmalleſt* matters, above all other ſorts of offenders in any degree whatſoever. Thus have we ſhewed and cleared the *firſt* and main difference betwixt *the caſe* of my Text, and the caſe of our Church, in regard of *the matter*: the things whereabout they differed, being every way *indifferent*; ours not ſo.

The determination of *Superiours* may and ought to reſtrain us in the outward exerciſe of our *Chriſtian liberty*. We muſt *ſubmit our ſelves to every*

Ordinance

Ordinance of man, ſaith St. *Peter*, 1 *Pet.* 2. 13. and it is neceſſary we ſhould do ſo: for *ſo is the will of God*, Ver. 15. Neither is it againſt *Chriſtian liberty* if we do ſo; for we are ſtill as free as before: rather if we do not ſo, we *abuſe our liberty for a cloak of maliciouſneſs*, as it followeth there, *ver.* 16. And St. *Paul* telleth us we *muſt needs be ſubject, not only for fear*, becauſe the Magiſtrate *carryeth not the Sword in vain, but alſo for Conſcience ſake*, becauſe *the powers that are, are ordained of God.* This duty, ſo fully preſſed and ſo uniformly by theſe two grand Apoſtles, is moſt apparent in *private ſocieties.* In a family, *the Maſter*, or *Pater familias*, who is a kind of *petty Monarch* there, hath authority to preſcribe to his *Children* and *ſervants* in the uſe of thoſe *indifferent things* whereto yet they, as *Chriſtians*, have as much *liberty* as he. *The ſervant*, though he be *the Lords free-man*, yet is limited in his *dyet, lodging, livery*, and many other things by his *maſter*: and he is to ſubmit himſelf to his Maſters appointment in theſe things, though perhaps in his *private affection* he had rather his Maſter had appointed otherwiſe: and perhaps withall in his *private judgement*, doth verily think it fitter his Maſter ſhould appoint otherwiſe. *If any man* under colour of *Chriſtian liberty*, ſhall *teach otherwiſe*, and exempt *ſervants* from the obedience of their *maſters* in ſuch things: St. *Paul* in a holy indignation inveigheth againſt ſueh a man, not without ſome bitterneſs, in the laſt Chapter of this Epiſtle, as one that *is proud, and knoweth nothing*, as he ſhould do,

but doateth about questions and strife of words, &c. ver. 3. 5.

Now look what power *the master* hath over his *servants* for the ordering of his *family*; no doubt the same at the least, if not much more, hath *the supreme magistrate* over his *subjects*, for the peace of *the Common-wealth*: the Magistrate being *Pater Patriæ*, as the Master is *Pater familias*. Whosoever then shall interpret *the determinations of magistrates* in the use of *the Creatures* to be contrary to *the liberty* of a Christian: or under that colour shall exempt *inferiours* from their *obedience* to such determinations, he must blame Saint *Paul*; nay he must blame *the holy Ghost*, and not us; if he hear from us that he is *proud, and knoweth nothing, and doateth about* unprofitable *questions*. Surely, but that *experience* sheweth us it hath been so, and *the Scriptures* have foretold us that it should be so; that there should be *differences*, and sidings, and part-takings in the Church: a man would wonder how it should ever sink into the hearts and heads of sober understanding men, to deny either *the power* in Superiours to *ordain*, or *the necessity* in Inferiours to *obey* Laws and constitutions, so restraining us in the use of *the Creatures*.

Neither let any man cherish his ignorance herein by conceiting, as if there were some difference to be made between *Civil* and *Ecclesiastical* Things, and Laws, and Persons in this behalf. The truth is, our *liberty* is equal in both: *the power* of Superiours for restraint equal in both, and *the necessity* of

obedience

obedience in Inferiours equal to both. No man hath yet been able to shew, nor I think ever shall be, a real and substantial difference indeed, between them to make an inequality. But that still, as *civil magistrates* have sometimes, for just politick respects, *prohibited* some trades, and manufactures, and commodities, and enjoyned others some, and done well in both: so *Church-Governours* may upon good considerations, (say it be but for order and uniformities sake,) prescribe the *times, places, vestments, gestures*, and other *Ceremonial circumstances* to be used in *Ecclesiastical* Offices and assemblies. As the Apostles in the first *Council* holden at Jerusalem in *Acts* 15. laid upon the Churches of the Gentiles for a time, a restraint from *the eating of blood, and things sacrificed to Idols, and strangled.*

Thus we see our *Christian liberty* unto the Creatures, may without prejudice admit of *some restraints* in *the outward exercise* of it: and namely from the three respects, of Christian *Sobriety*, of Christian *charity*, and of Christian *Duty* and Obedience. But now in the comparing of these together; when there seemeth to be a repugnancy between one and another of them, there may be some difficulty: and the greatest difficulty, and which hath bred most trouble, is in comparing the cases of *scandal* and *disobedience* together, when there seemeth to be a repugnancy between *charity* and *Duty*. As for example, Suppose in a thing which simply and in it self we may *lawfully* according to

the

the Liberty we have in Christ, either use or forbear; *charity* seemeth to lay restraint upon us one way, our *weak* brother expecting we should *forbear*, and *Duty* a quite contrary way, *Authority* requiring *the use*: in such a case what are we to do? It is against *charity* to offend *a brother*; and it is against *Duty*, to disobey *a superiour*. And yet something must be done: either we must *use*, or *not use*; *forbear*, or *not forbear*. For the untying of this knot, (which, if we will but lay things rightly together; hath not in it so much hardness as it seemeth to have;) let this be our *seventh Position*. In the use of *the creatures*, and all *indifferent things*, we ought to bear a greater regard to our *publike Governours*, than to our *private Brethren*; and be more careful to *obey* them, than to *satisfie* these, if the same course will not in some mediocrity satisfie both. Alas, that our brethren who are contrary minded, would but with the spirit of sobriety admit *common Reason* to be umpire in this case: Alas, that they would but consider, what a world of *contradictions* would follow upon the contrary *opinion*, and what a world of *confusions* upon the contrary *practice*. Say what can be said, in the behalf of a *Brother*; all the same, and more may be said for a *Governour*. For a *Governour* is a *Brother* too, and something more: and *Duty* is *charity* too, and something more. If then I may not offend my *Brother*, then certainly not my *Governour*: because he is my *brother* too, being a *man*, and a *christian*, as well as the other is. And the same *charity*, that

bindeth me to ſatisfie *another Brother*, equally bind-[eth] me to ſatisfie *this*. So that, if we go no farther, but even to the common bond of *charity*, and relation of *Brother-hood*; that maketh them *equal* at the leaſt: and therefore no reaſon, why I ſhould ſatisfie one that is but a *Private Brother*; rather then *the publike magiſtrate*, who (that publike reſpect ſet aſide) is my *Brother* alſo. When the Scales hang thus even, ſhall not the acceſſion of *magiſtracy* to common *Brother-hood* in him, and of *Duty* to common *charity* in me, be enough to caſt it clear for *the magiſtrate*? Shall a *ſervant* in a Family, rather than *offend* his fellow-ſervant, *diſobey* his Maſter? And is not a *double ſcandal* againſt *charity* and *Duty* both (for *Duty* implyeth *charity*) greater than a *ſingle ſcandal* againſt *charity* alone? If private men will be offended at our *obedience* to publike *Governours*; we can but be ſorry for it: We may not redeem their *offence* by our *diſobedience*. He that *taketh* offence where none is *given*, ſuſtaineth a double perſon; and muſt anſwer for it, both as *the giver* and *the taker*. If offence be taken at us, there is no woe to us for it, if it do not come by us; *Woe to the man by whom the offence commeth*: and it doth not come by us, if we do but what is our duty to do. *The Rule* is certain and equitable; The reſpect of *private ſcandal* ceaſeth, where *lawful authority* determineth our *liberty*: and that *reſtraint* which proceedeth from *ſpecial Duty*, is of ſuperiour reaſon to that which proceedeth but from *common charity*.

Queſt. *Whether the King and Parliament ought to Impoſe any more upon us, in matters of Rel[illegible] than is* Impoſed *in the Scripture: or whether every one ought not to be left to ſerve God, according to his beſt apprehenſions out of the Scripture.*

Anſw. The *Opinion* is, that to do any thing at all without direction from *the Scripture* is unlawful and ſinful. Which if they would underſtand only of the ſubſtantials of *Gods worſhip*, and of the exerciſes of *ſpiritual and ſupernatural graces*, the aſſertion were true and ſound: but as they extend it, to *all the actions of common life* whatſoever, whether natural or civil, even ſo farre as to the *taking up of a ſtraw*: ſo it is altogether falſe and indefenſible. I marvel what warrant they that ſo teach have from *the Scripture* for that very doctrine: or where they are commanded ſo to *believe* or *teach*. One of their chiefeſt refuges is *the Text* we now have in hand: but I ſhall anon drive them from this ſhelter. The other places uſually alleaged ſpeak only, either of divine and *ſupernatural truths* to be believed, or elſe of *workes of grace or worſhip* to be performed, as of neceſſity unto ſalvation: which is not to the point in iſſue. For it is freely confeſſed, that in things of ſuch nature *the Holy Scripture* is, and ſo we are to account it, a moſt *abſolute ſufficient* direction. Upon which ground we heartily reject all *humane traditions*, deviſed and intended as *ſupplements* to *the doctrine of faith* contained in *the Bible*, and annexed as *codicils* to the holy *Teſtament* of Chriſt, for to ſupply the defects thereof.

thereof. The queſtion is wholly about things in their nature *indifferent*, ſuch as are the uſe of our *food, raiment*, and the like; about which *the common actions* of life are chiefly converſant: Whether in the choice and uſe of ſuch things, we may not be ſometimes ſufficiently guided by the light of *reaſon* and the common rules of *diſcretion*: but that we muſt be able, (and are ſo bound to do, or elſe we *ſinne*) for every thing *we do* in ſuch matters, or deduce our *warrant* from ſome place or other of *Scripture*.

Before *the Scripture* were written it pleaſed GOD by *viſions*, and *dreams*, and other like *revelations*, immediately to make known his good pleaſure to the *Patriarches* and *Prophets*, and by them unto the people: which kind of *Revelations* ſerved them to all the ſame intents and purpoſes, whereto the ſacred *Scriptures* now do us, *viz.* to inſtruct them what they ſhould *believe* and *do* for his better *ſervice*, and the furtherance of their own *ſalvation*. Now as it were unreaſonable for any man to think, that they either had or did expect an *immediate revelation* from God every time they *eat*, or *drank*, or *bought*, or *ſold*, or did any other of *the common actions* of life, for the warranting of each of thoſe particular actions to their conſciences: no leſs unreaſonable it is to think, that we ſhould now expect the like *warrant* from *the Scriptures* for the doing of the like actions. Without all doubt *the Law of nature*, and *the light of reaſon*, was *the rule* whereby they were guided for the moſt part in ſuch matters:

which the wisdome of God would never have left in them or us, as a *principal relique* of his decayed *image* in us, if he had not meant, that we should make use of it, for *the direction* of our lives and actions thereby. Certainly God never infused any *power* into any creature, whereof he intended not some *use*. Else, what shall we say of *the Indies* and other barbarous nations, to whom God never vouchsafed *the lively Oracles* of his written word? Must we think that they were left *a lawless people*, without any *Rule* at all whereby to order their *actions*? How then come they to be guilty of *transgression*? for where there is *no Law*, there can be *no transgession*. Or how cometh it about that their *consciences* should at any time or in any case either *accuse* them, or *excuse* them, if they had no *guide* nor *rule* to walk by? But if we must grant they had *a Rule*, (and there is no way, you see, but grant it we must;) then we must also of necessity grant that there is some *other Rule* for humane actions besides *the written word*: for that we presupposed these nations to have wanted. Which *Rule* what other could it be, then *the Law of the Nation* and of *right reason*, imprinted *in their hearts*! Which is as truly *the Law* and *Word of God*, as is that which is printed *in our Bibles*. So long as our *actions* are *warranted* either by the one or the other, we cannot be said to want *the warrant of Gods Word*: *Nec differet Scriptura an ratione consistat*, saith *Tertullian*; it mattereth not much from whether of both we have our *direction*, so long as we have it from either.

You

You ſee then thoſe men are in a great errour, who make the holy Scriptures *the ſole rule* of all humane actions whatſoever. For the maintenance whereof, there was never yet produced any piece of an argument, either from *reaſon*, or from *authority* of holy writ, or from the *teſtimony* either of the ancient *Fathers*, or of other claſſical *Divines* of later times; which may not be clearly and abundantly anſwered, to the ſatisfaction of any rational man not extreamly fore-poſſeſſed with prejudice. "They who think to ſalve the matter by this *miti-*
"*gation*; that at leaſt wiſe our actions ought to be
"framed according to thoſe *general rules* of *the*
"*Law of Nature*, which are here and there in the
"Scriptures diſperſedly contained; (as *viz. That we*
"*ſhould do, as we would be done to*; *That all things*
"*be done decently and orderly, and unto edificati-*
"*on*; *That nothing be done againſt conſcience*, and
"the like:) ſpeak ſomewhat indeed to *the truth*,
"but little to *the purpoſe*. For they conſider not,
"*Firſt* that theſe *general Rules* are but *occaſionally*
"and *incidentally* mentioned in Scripture; rather
"to manifeſt unto us *a former*, than to lay upon us
"*a new obligation*. *Secondly*, that thoſe *rules* had
"been of force for the ordering of mens actions,
"though *the Scripture* had never *expreſſed* them:
"and were of ſuch force, before *thoſe Scriptures*
"were written, wherein they are now *expreſſed*.
"For they bind not originally *qua ſcripta*, but *qua*
"*juſta*; becauſe they are *righteous*, not becauſe
"they are *written*. *Thirdly*, that an action con-

 "formable

" formable to these *general Rules* might not be con-
" demned as *sinful*, although the doer thereof
" should look at those rules meerly as they are the
" dictates of *the law of nature*; and should not be
" able to vouch his *warrant* for it from any place of
" *Scripture*, neither should have at the time of the
" doing thereof any present thought or considera-
" tion of any such place. The contrary whereunto,
" I permit to any mans reasonable judgement, if it
" be not desperately *rash* and *uncharitable* to affirm.
" *Lastly*, that if mens actions done agreeably to those
" *rules* are said to be *of faith*, precisely for this rea-
" son, because those rules are contained in *the word*:
" then it will follow, that before those *particular*
" *Scriptures* were written wherein any of those
" *rules* are first delivered, every action done accor-
" ding to those rules had been done *without faith*,
" (there being as yet *no Scripture* for it;) and con-
" sequently had been a sin. So that by this doctrine
" it had been a sin (before the writing of
" S. *Matthews Gospel*) for any man to have done to
" others as he would they should do to him; and
" it had been a sin (before the writing of *the former*
" *Epistle to the Corinthians*) for any man to have
" done any thing *decently* and *orderly*; supposing
" these *two Rules* to be in those *two places* first men-
" tioned: because (this supposed) there could then
" have been no warrant brought from *the Scriptures*
" for so doing.

" Well then, we see the former Opinion will by
" no means hold, neither in the *rigour* of it, nor yet

" in

"in *the mitigation*. We are therefore to beware of it; and that ſo much the more heedfully, becauſe of the *evil conſequents* and effects that iſſue from it: to wit, a world of *ſuperſtitions*, uncharitable *cenſures*, bitter *contentions*, *contempt* of ſuperiours, *perplexities* of conſcience. *Firſt*, it filleth mens heads with many *ſuperſtitious* conceits, making them to caſt *impurity* upon ſundry things, which yet are *lawful* to as many as uſe them lawfully. For the taking away of *the indifferency* of any thing that is indifferent, is in truth *Superſtition*: whether either of the two wayes it be done, either by *requiring* it as *neceſſary*, or by *forbidding* it as *unlawful*. He that condemneth a thing as *utterly unlawful*, which yet indeed is *indifferent*, and ſo lawful, is *guilty* of *ſuperſtion*, as well as he that enjoyneth a thing as *abſolutely neceſſary*, which yet indeed is but *indifferent*, and ſo arbitrary. They of *the Church of Rome*, and ſome in *our Church*, as they go upon quite contrary *grounds*, yet both *falſe*; ſo they run into quite contrary *errours*, and both *ſuperſtitious*. They decline too much on *the left hand*, denying to *holy Scripture* that *perfection* which of right it ought to have; of containing all appertaining to that *ſupernatural doctrine* of faith and holineſs which God hath revealed to his Church for the attainment of everlaſting ſalvation: whereupon they would impoſe upon Chriſtian people, and that with an opinion of *neceſſity*, many things with *the Scriptures* require not: and that is *a Superſtition*. Theſe wry too much on *the right hand*, aſcribing

aſcribing to the *holy Scripture* ſuch a kind of *perfection* as it cannot have; of being the ſole directour of all *humane actions* whatſoever: whereupon they *forbid* unto Chriſtian people, and that under the name of *ſinne*, ſundry things which the holy *Scripture* condemneth not: and that is *a ſuperſtition* too.

From which *Superſtition* proceedeth in the ſecond place *uncharitable cenſuring*: as evermore they that are the moſt *ſuperſtitious*, are the moſt *ſupercilious*. No ſuch ſevere *cenſurers* of our bleſſed Saviours perſon and actions, as the *ſuperſtitious* Scribes and Phariſees were. In this Chapter the ſpecial fault, which the Apoſtle blameth in the *weak ones*, (who were ſomewhat *ſuperſtitiouſly* affected,) was their *raſh* and *uncharitable judging* of their brethren. And common and daily experience among our ſelves ſheweth how freely ſome men ſpend their *cenſures* upon ſo many of their brethren, as *without ſcruple* do any of thoſe things, which they upon falſe grounds have *ſuperſtitiouſly* condemned as *utterly unlawful*.

And then *thirdly*, as unjuſt *cenſures* are commonly entertained with *ſcorn* and contumely; they that ſo liberally condemn their brethren of *prophanneſs*, are by them again as freely flouted for their *preciſeneſs*: and ſo whiles both parties *pleaſe themſelves* in their own wayes, they ceaſe not mutually to *provoke* and ſcandalize and exaſperate the one the other, purſuing their private ſpleens ſo far, till they break out into *open contentions* and oppoſitions,

ons. Thus it stood in the *Roman Church*, when this Epistle was written. They *judged* one another, and *dispised* one another, to the great disturbance of *the Churches peace*: which gave occasion to our Apostles whole discourse in this Chapter. And how far the like *censurings* and *despisings* have embittered *the spirits*, and whetted both *the tongues* and *pens* of learned men one against another in our own Church; the stirs that have been long since *raised*, and are still *upheld* by the factions opposers against our *Ecclesiastical constitutions*, *government*, and *ceremonies*, will not suffer us to be ignorant. Most of which stirs, I verily perswade my self, had been long ere this either wholly buried in silence, or at leastwise prettily well quieted, if *the weakness* and *danger* of the errour whereof we now speak, had been more timely discovered, and more *fully* and *frequently* made known to the world than it hath been.

Fourthly, let that doctrine be once admitted, and all *humane authority* will soon be *despised*. The commands of *Parents*, *Masters*, *and Princes*, which many times require both *secrecy* and *expedition*, shall be taken into slow deliberation; and *the equity* of them sifted by those that are bound to *obey*, though they know no cause why, so long as they know no cause to the contrary. *Delicata est obedientia, quæ transit in causam deliberat vam.* It is a nice obedience in St. *Bernards* judgement, yea rather *troublesome* and odious, that is over curious

in *discussing* the commands of *superiours*; boggling at every thing that is enjoyned, requiring a *why for every wherefore*, and unwilling to stir until the *lawfulness*, and *expediency* of the thing commanded shall be demonstrated by some manifest *reason*, or undoubted *authority* from the Scriptures.

Lastly, the admitting of this doctrine would cast such a snare upon men of weak *judgements*, but tender *consciences*, as they should never be able to unwind themselves again. Mens *daily occasions* for themselves or friends, and *the necessities of common life*, require the doing of *a thousand things* within the compass of a few dayes; for which it would puzzle the best *Textman* that liveth, readily to bethink himself of *a sentence in the Bible*, clear enough to satisfie a scrupulous conscience of *the lawfulness* and *expediency* of what he is about to do: for which, by hearkening to the rules of *reason* and *discretion*, he might receive easie and speedy resolution. In which cases if he should be bound to *suspend* his resolution, and delay to do that which his own *reason* would tell him were presently needful to be done, until he could haply call to mind some *precept* or *example* of Scripture for his warrant: what *stops* would it make in the course of his whole life? what *languishings* in the duties of his calling? how would it fill him with *doubts* and irresolutions, lead him into a maze of *uncertainties*, entangle him in a world of woful *perplexities*, and (without the great mercy of God, and better

better instruction) plunge him irrecoverably into the gulph of *despair?* Since the chief end of the publication of *the Gospel*, is to *comfort* the hearts, and to revive and refresh the spirits of *Gods* people with the glad tidings of *liberty* from the spirt of *bondage* and *fear*, and of gracious *acceptance* with their GOD; to anoint them with *the oyl of gladness* giving them *beauty for Ashes*, and instead of *sackcloath* girding them with *joy*: we may well suspect that *doctrine* not to be *Evangelical*, which thus setteth the consciences of men upon *the rack*, tortureth them with continual *fears* and *perplexities*, and prepareth them thereby unto *hellish dispaire.*

Quest. *What are the dreadful consequences of* scrupling *some indifferent things?*

Answ. Although difference of *judgement* should not alienate our *affections* one from another: yet daily experience sheweth it doth. By reason of that *self-love*, and *envy*, and other corruptions that abound in us; it is rarely seen that those men are of *one heart*, that are of *two mindes.* St. *Paul* found it so with the *Romans* in his time: whilest some condemned that as *unlawful*, which others practised as *lawful*; they *judged* one another, and *disposed* one another, perpetually. And I doubt not, but any of us, that is any-whit-like acquainted with the wretched *deceitfulness of mans heart*, may easily conclude how hard a thing it is, (if at all

possible,) not to think somewhat hardly of those men, that take *the liberty* to do such "things a we "judge *unlawful*. As for example, If we shall judge all *walking* into the fields, *discoursing occasionally* on the occurrences of the times, *dressing of meat* for dinner or supper, or even *moderate recreations on the Lords day*, to be grievous *prophanations of the Sabbath*; how can we chuse but *judge* those men that use them to be grievous *prophaners of Gods Sabbath*? And if such our *judgment* concering *the things* should after prove to be *erroneous*: then can it not be avoided, but that such our *judment* also concerning *the persons* "must needs be *uncharitable*.

Secondly, This mis-judging of things filleth the would with endless niceties and *disputes*; to the great disturbance of *the Churches peace*, which to every good man ought to be precious. The multiplying of *Books* and *writings pro* and *con*, and pursuing of *arguments* with heat and opposition, doth rather *lengthen*, then *decide* controversides; and instead of destroying *the old*, begetteth *new ones*: whiles they that are *in the wrong* out of obstinacy *will not*, and they that stand *for the truth* out of conscience *dare not*, may not *yeild*; and so still the war goeth on.

And as to *the publick peace* of the Church, so is there also *thirdly* by this means great prejudice done to *the peace* and tranquillity of private *mens con-*

conſciences? when by *the peremptory doctrines* of ſome ſtrict and *rigid maſters*, the ſouls of many a well-meaning man are miſerably diſquieted with a thousand *unneceſſary ſcruples*. And driven ſometimes into very woful *perplexities*. Surely it can be no light matter, thus to lay *heavey burdens* upon other mens ſhoulders, and to caſt *a ſnare* upon their conſciences, by making *the narrow way to Heaven* narrower then ever God meant it.

Fourthly, hereby Chriſtian *Governours* come to be robbed of a great part of that *honour* that is due unto them from their people; both in their *Affections* and *Subjection*. For when they ſhall ſee cauſe to exerciſe over us that *power* that God hath left them in *indifferent things*, by commanding ſuch or ſuch things to be done; as namely, *wearing* of a Surplice, *kneeling* at the communion, and the like: if now we in our own thoughts have already *prejudged* any of the things ſo commanded to be *unlawful*; i cannot be.

Queſt. *If theſe things be ſo, how comes it to paſs that ſo many godly men ſhould incline ſo much to this way?*

Anſw. But you will ſay, if theſe things were ſo, how ſhould it then come to paſs that ſo many men pretending, to *Goline ſs*, (and *thouſands* of them doubtleſs ſuch as they *pretend*; for it were an uncharitable thing to charge them all with *hypocriſie*) ſhould

ſhould ſo often and ſo grievouſly offend this way? To omit thoſe two more *univerſal cauſes*; Almighty *Gods permiſſion* firſt, whoſe good pleaſure it is, for ſundry wiſe and gratious ends, to exerciſe *his Church* during her warfare here with *hereſies* and *ſcandals*: And then the *willineſs* of *Satan*, who cunningly obſerveth whither way our hearts incline moſt, to *looſneſs*, or to *ſtrictneſs*; and then frameth his *temptations* thereafter: So he can but put *us out of the way*; it is no great matter to him, *on whether hand* it be: he hath *his end* howſoever. Nor to inſiſt upon ſundry more *particular cauſes*: as namely, a natural proneneſs in all men to *ſuperſtition*: in many an *affectation* of *ſingularity*, to go beyond the ordinary ſort of people in ſomething or other; the difficulty of ſhunning one without running into *the contrary extream*; the great force of *education* and *cuſtome*; beſides manifold *abuſes, offences and provocations*, ariſing from *the carriage* of others; and the reſt: I ſhall note but theſe two only, as the *two* great *fountains* of Errour, (to which alſo moſt of the other may be reduced,) *Ignorance* and *Partiality*: from neither of which Gods deareſt ſervants and children are in this life wholly exempted.

Ignorance firſt is a fruitful mother of *Errours*. (*Ye erre not knowing the Scriptures, Matth.*22. Yet not ſo much, *Groſs Ignorance* neither: I mean not that. For your meer *Ignaro*'s, what they erre, they erre *for company*: they *judge* not at all; neither according to *the appearance*, nor yet *righteous judgement*.

ment. They only *run on* with the *herd*, and *follow* as they are *led*, be it right or wrong; and never trouble themſelves farther. But by *Ignorance* I mean *weakneſs of judgement*, which conſiſteth in a *diſproportion* between *the affections*, and *the underſtanding*: when a man is very *earneſt*, but withall very *ſhallow*: readeth much, and heareth much, and thinketh that he knoweth much, but hath not *the judgement* to ſever truth from falſhood, nor to *diſcern* between a ſound *argument* and a captious *fallacy*. And ſo for want of ability to examine the ſoundneſs and ſtrength of thoſe *principles*, from whence he fetcheth his *concluſions*; he is eaſily carried away, as our Apoſtle elſewhere ſpeaketh, with *vain words*, and *empty arguments*. As St. *Auguſtine* ſaid of *Donatus*, *Rationes arripuit* he catcheth hold of ſome reaſons, (as *wranglers* will *catch* at a ſmal thing, rather then *yeild* from their opinions,) *quas conſiderantes, veriſimiles eſſe potius quam veras invenimus*: which ſaith he, we found to have more *ſhew of probability* at the firſt appearance, then *ſubſtance of truth* after they were well conſidered of.

And I dare ſay, whoſoever ſhall peruſe with a judicious and unpartial eye moſt of thoſe *Pamphlets*, that in this daring age have been thruſt into the World againſt *the Ceremonies* of the Church, againſt *Epiſcopal Government*; (to paſs by things of leſſer regard and uſefulneſs, and more open to *acception* and *abuſe*, yet ſo far as I can underſtand, unjuſtly con-

condemned as things *utterly unlawful*; such as are *luxurious lots, dancing, Stage-plays*, and some other things of like nature;) When he shall have drained out the bitter *invectives*, unmannerly *jeers*, petulant *guirding* at those that are in authority, impertinent *digressions*, but above all those most bold and *perverse wrestings* of holy *Scripture*, wherewith such books are infinitely stuffels, he shall find that little poor remainder that is left behind, to contain nothing but *vain words and empty arguments*. For when these great undertakers have snatcht up the bucklers, as if they would make it good against all comers, that such and such things are *utterly unlawful*; and therefore ought in all reason and conscience, to bring such *proofs* as will come up to that *conclusion*: *Quid dignum tanto*? very seldome shall you hear from them any other arguments, then such as will conclude but an *Inexpediency* at the most. As, that they are apt to *give scandal*; that they carry with them an *appearance of evil*; that they are often *occasions of sin*; that they are *not commanded* in the Word; and such like. Which *Objections*, even where they are *just*, are not of force, (no not taken *altogether*, much less any of them *singly*,) to prove a thing to be *utterly unlawful*. And yet are they glad many times, rather then sit out, to play very *small Game*, and to make use of *Arguments* not weaker then these, and such as will not reach so far as to prove a Dare, *Inexpediency*. As, that they were invented by *Heathens*; that they have been abused in *Popery*; and other

eth

ſuch like. Which to my underſtanding is a very *ſtrong preſumption*, that they have taken a very *weak cauſe* in hand, and ſuch as is wholly deſtitute of ſound proof.

Queſt. *Whether what the* King *and* Parliament *have* determined *may be* altered *to* ſatisfie *private men*,

Anſw. While things are in agitation; *private men* may, if any thing ſeem to them *inexpedient*, modeſtly tender their *thoughts* together with the *reaſons* thereof, to the conſideration of thoſe that are in *authority*: to whoſe care and wiſdom it belongeth, in preſcribing any thing concerning *indifferent things*, to proceed with all juſt adviſedneſs and moderation: that ſo the *Subject* may be encouraged to perform that *obedience* with cheerfulneſs, which of neceſſity he muſt perform howſoever. It concerneth *Superiours* therefore to look well to the *expediency*, and *inexpediency* of what they enjoyn in indifferent things. Wherein if there be a fault, it muſt lie upon their account: *the neceſſity of obedience* is to us a ſufficient diſcharge in that behalf. Only it were good we did remember, that they are to give up that account *to God onely*, and *not to us*. But after that things are once concluded and *eſtabliſhed* by publick authority, *Acts* paſſed and *Conſtitutions* made concerning the ſame, and the will and pleaſure of *the higher powers* ſufficiently made known therein: then for *private men* to put

in their eye, and with *unseasonable diligence* to call in question the *decency* or *expediency* of the things so established, yea with *intolerable pride*, to refuse *obedience* thereunto meerly upon this pretension, that they are *undecent* or *inexpedient*; is it self in the most *indecent* and *inexpedient* thing that can be imagined.

For that the fear of *offending a private brother*, is a thing not considerable in comparison of the duty of *obedience to a publike Governour*; might be shown so apparantly by sundry arguments, if we had time to *enlarge* and *illustrate* them, as might sufficiently *convince* the judgement of any man not wilfully obstinate in that point. I shall only crave leave briefly to touch at some of them. *First* then, when *Governours* shall have appointed what seemed to them *expedient*; and *private men* shall refuse to observe the same, pretending it to be *inexpedient*: who shall judge thereof? Either they themselves that take the exceptions must be *judges*; which is both unreasonable and preposterous: or else *every man* must be his own judge, which were to overthrow all Government, and to bring in a confusion, every man to do what is *good in his own eyes*: or else *the known governours* must judge; and then you know what will follow, even to *submit* and *obey*.

Secondly, to allow men under the pretence of *inexpediency*, and because of *some offence* that may be

be taken thereat, to disobey *laws* and *constitutions* made by those that are in authority; were the next way to cut the sinews of all *authority*, and to bring both *Magistrates* and *Laws* into contempt. For what *Law* ever was made, or can be made so just and so reasonable, but some man or other either did, or might take offence thereat? And what man that is disposed to *disobey*, but may pretend *inexpediency* or other, wherewith to countenance out such his *disobedience*.

Thirdly, it is agreed by consent of all that handle the matter of *Scandal*, that we may not commit any sin whatsoever, be it never so small, for the avoiding of any *scandall*, be it never so *great*. But to *disobey* lawful authority in lawful things, is a *sin* against the *fifth Commandement*. Therefore we may not redeem a *scandall* by such our *disobedience*; nor refuse to do the thing commanded by such *authority*, whosoever should take offence thereat.

Fourthly, though *lawfulnesse* and *unlawfulnesse* be not, yet *expediency* and *inexpediency* are (as we heard) capable of the degrees of *more* and *lesse*; and then in all reason, of *two inexpedient things* we are to do that which is *lesse inexpedient*, for the avoiding of that which is more *inexpedient*. Say then there be an *inexpediency* in doing the thing commanded by authority, when a Brother is thereby offended; is there not a greater *inexpediency* in *not doing* it, when the *Magistrate* is thereby *disobayed*?

beyed? It is not more *expedient*, and conducing to the *common good*, that a *publick Magiſtrate* ſhould be obeyed in a *juſt command*, then that a *private perſon* ſhould be gratified in a *cauſeleſſe ſcruple*.

Fifthly, when by refuſing *obedience* to the lawfull commands of our *Superiours*, we think to ſhun *the offending of one or two* weak brethren; we do in truth incurr thereby a far *more grievous ſcandall*, by giving *offence to hundreds* of others: whoſe conſciences by our *Diſobedience* will be emboldned to that, whereto corrupt nature is but too too prone, to affront the Magiſtrate, and *deſpiſe the authority*.

Laſtly, where we are not able to diſcharge both, *debts of juſtice* are to be payed, before *debts of charity*. Now the duty of *obedience* is *debitum juſtitiæ* and a matter of *right*, my ſuperiour may challenge it at my hands as is *due*; and I do him *wrong* if I with-hold it from him. But the care of not giving offence is but *debitum charitatis*, and a matter but of *courteſie*. I am to perform it to my brother *in love*, when I ſee cauſe: but he cannot challenge it from me as *his right*: nor can juſtly ſay I do him *wrong*, if I neglect it. It is therefore no more lawfull for me, to *diſobey* the lawful command of a *Superiour*, to prevent thereby the *offence* of one or a few *brethren*: then it is lawfull for me to do one man *wrong*, to do another man a courteſie withall;

or

or then it is lawful for me to rob the *Exchequer*, to relieve an *Hospital*.

I see not yet how any of these *six reasons* can be fairly avoided: and yet, (which would be considered,) if but *any one* of them hold good, it is enough to *carry the cause*: And therefore I hope there need be no more said in this matter. To conclude then, for the point of *practise*, (which is the main thing I aimed at in the choice of *this Text*, and my whole meditations thereon,) we may take our direction in these *three Rules*; easie to be understood and remembred, and not hard to be observed in our practise, if we will but bring our good wils thereunto. *First*, If God command, we must *submit* without any more adoe; and not trouble our selves about *the experiency*, or so much as about *the unlawfulness* for both *Abraham* never disputed whether it were *expedient* for him, not yet whether it were *lawful* for him to sacrifice his son or no, when once it appeared to him that God would have it so.

Secondly, If our *Superiours*, endued with lawful authority thereunto, cammand us any thing; we *may* & (where we have *just cause of doubt*) we *ought* to enquire into *the unlawfulness* thereof. Yet not withstanding such *anxious curiosity*, as if we desired to find out some *loop-hole* whereby to evade; but with such *modest ingenuity*, as may witness God and the world the unfeigned sincerity of our desires

both to *fear God*, and to *honour those* that he hath set over us. And if having used ordinary *moral diligence bona fide* to informe our selves the best we can, there appear no *unlawfulness* in it; we are then also to *submit* and *obey* without any more adoe never troubling our selves farther to enquire whether it be *expedient* yea or no. Let them that *command* us look to that: for it is they must *answer for it*, and not we.

But then *thirdly*, where *authority* hath left us *free*; no *command*, either of God, or of those that are set over us under God, having *prescribed* any thing to us in that behalf: there it is at our own *liberty* and *choyce*, to do as we shall think good. Yet are we not left so loose, as that we may do what we list, so as the thing be but *lawful*; (for that were *licentiousness*, and not *liberty*:) but we must ever do that, which according to the exigence of *present circumstances*, (so far as all *the wisdome* and *charity* we have will serve us to judge,) shall seem to us *most expedient*, and profitable to mutual *Edification*. This is the way: God give us all grace to walk in it. So shall we bring *glory* to him, and to our selves *comfort*: so shall we further his *work* onward, and our own *account* at the last.

Quest. *Whether they that have taken the Covenant May Renounce it?*

Answ. Thirdly, beware of *engaging thy self to sin*. It is a fearful thing, when sin hath got *a tye* upon a man. Then is one properly *in the snare of the Devil*; when he hath him as it were in a string,

and

and may *lead him captive* to what measure of *presumption* he will. And sundry wayes may a man thus entangle himself: by a *Verbal*, by a *Real*, by a *Sinful Engagement*. He shall do best to keep himself out of all these *snares*. But if once he be in; there is no way out again but one: even this, *To loose his pledge*, to break in sunder *the bonds* wherein he is tied, as *Sampson* did the *green withs*, and to cast away those *cords* from him.

A man hath bound himself rashly by some *promise*, *vow*, or *covenant*, to do something he *may not do*, or not to do something he *ought to do*. He is now *engaged* in a sin: the Devil hath got *this tye* upon him. And though *his conscience* tell him he cannot proceed without *sin*; yet because of his *Vow*, or his *Oath*, he is *wilful*, and must on. It was *Herods* Case; for taking of the *Baptists* head. It was *against his conscience* to do it: for he knew he had *not diserved* it: Ey, and it was *against his minde* too to do it; for the Text saith, he was *exceeding sorry* that his neice should put him upon it. But yet, saith the story withall, *for his Oath sake*, and because *the great ones* about him should not say but the King would be *as big as the word*, he resolved it should be done, and *gave commandment* accordingly to have it done. This I call *a Verbal Engagement*.

Quest. *Whether we English-men may think our selves bound by the Solemne League and Covenant?*

Answ. Without betraying the Liberty, which by our Protestation we are bound, and in the third Article

Article of this Covenant must swear, *with our lives and fortunes to preserve.* To which Liberty the imposition of a new Oath, other then is established by Act of Parliament, it expressed in *the Petition of Right*, and by the Lords and Commons in their *Declarations* acknowledged to be contrary.

3. Without acknowledgeing in the imposers, a greater power then, for ought that appeareth to us, hath been in former times challenged; Or can consist with our former Protestation (if we rightly understand it) in sundry the most material branches thereof.

Neither, secondly, are we satisfied; although the Covenant should not be imposed on us at al, but only recommended to us, and then left to our choice.

1. How we should in wisedom and Duty (being Subjects) of our own accord and free will enter into a Covenant, wherein He, whose Subjects we are, is in any wise concerned, without His consent, either expressed or reasonably presumed. It being in his power (as we conceive) by the equity of the Law, *Numb.* 30. to annull and make voyd the same at his pleasure.

2. How we can (now that His Majesty hath by His publique *Interdict* sufficiently made known His pleasure in that behalfe) enter into a Covenant, the taking whereof he hath expresly forbidden; without forfeiting that Obedience, which (as we are perswaded) by our natural Allegiance and former Oathes we owe unto all such His Majesties Commands, as are not in our apprehensions repugnant to the wil of God, or the positive laws of this Kingdom.

Quest.

Queſt. *What ſhall a man do that ſcruples in Conſcience what Authority enjoyns as unlawful.*

But then *thirdly*, if *the liberty* of the agent be determined by the command of ſome *ſuperiour power* to whom he oweth *obedience*; ſo as he is not now *ſui juris ad hoc*, to do or not to do at his own choice, but to do what he is *commanded*: this one circumſtance quite altereth the whole caſe, & now he is bound in conſcience to do *the thing commanded*; his *doubtfulneſſe* of mind whether that thing be *lawful* or no, notwithſtanding. To do that whereof he *doubteth*, where he hath *free liberty* to leave it undone, bringeth upon him (as we have already ſhewn) the guilt of *wilful tranſgreſſion*: but not ſo where he is not left to his own *liberty*. And where *lawful authority* preſcribeth *in alterutram partem*, there the liberty *ad utramque partem contradictionis* is taken away, from ſo many as are under that authority. If they that are over them have determined it *one way*; it is not thenceforth any more at their choice, whether they will take *that way*, or *the contrary*: but they muſt go the way that is appointed them without gainſaying or grudging. And if in the deed done at *the command* of one that is endued with lawful authority there be a *ſin*, it muſt go on his ſcore that requireth it wrongfully, not on his that doth but his duty in obeying. A Prince commandeth his *Subjects* to ſerve in his *Warres*: it may be the quarrel is *unjuſt*, it may be there may appear to the underſtanding of the Subject great likelihoods of ſuch *injuſtice*; yet may *the Subject* for all that *fight* in that quarrel; yea, he is bound in conſcience ſo to do: nay, he is deep in diſloyalty and treaſon if *he refuſe* the ſervice, whatſoever pretenſions he may make of *conſcience* for ſuch refuſal. Neither need that fear trouble him leſt he ſhould bring upon himſelf the guilt of *innocent*

 blood,

blood; for *the blood* that is unrighteously shed in that quarrel, he must answer for that *set him on work*, not he that *spilt it*. And truly it is a great wonder to me, that any man endued with understanding, and that is able in any measure to weigh the force of those *precepts* and *reasons* which bind *inferiours* to yield obedience to their *superiours*, should be otherwise minded in cases of like nature. Whatsoever is commanded us by those whom God hath set over us, either in Church, Common wealth, or Family, (*Quod tamen non sit certum displicere Deo*, saith S. *Bern.*) which is not evidently contrary to *the Law* and will of God, ought to be of us received and *obeyed* no otherwise, then as if *God* himself had commanded it, because God himself hath commanded us to *obey the higher powers*, and to *submit our selves to their ordinances*. Say it be not well don of them to command it! *Sed enim quid hoc refert tua?* saith he. What is that to thee? Let them look to that whom it concerneth: *Tolle quod tuum est, & vade.* Do thou what is thine own part faithfully, and never trouble thy self further. *Ipsum quem pro Deo habemus, tanquam Deum in his quæ aperte non sunt contra Deum audire debemus*; *Bernard* still. Gods Vicegerents must be heard and *obeyed* in all things that are not manifestly contrary to *the revealed will* of God.

But the thing required is *against my conscience*, may som say, and I may not go against my *conscience*, for any mans pleasure. Judg I pray you what perverseness is this, when the blessed Apostle commandeth thee *to obey for conscience sake*, that thou shouldest *disobey*, & that for *conscience sake* too: He chargeth thee upon thy conscience to *be subject*, and thou pretendest thy conscience to *free thee* from subjection. This by the way, now to the point. Thou sayest it is *against thy conscience*: I say again, that (in the case where-

where of we now speak, the case of *doubtfullness*) it is not against thy conscience. For doubting properly is *motus indifferens in utramque partem contradictionis*; when the mind is held in suspence between *two* weys, uncertain whether of both to take to. When the scales hang even (as I said before) and *in æquilibrio*, without any notable propension or inclination to the one side more than to the other. And surely where things hang thus *even*, if *the weight of authority* will not cast the scale either way: we may well suppose, that either *the authority* is made very *light*, or else there is a great fault in *the beame*. Know (brethren) the *gainsaying conscience* is one thing, and the *doubting conscience* another. That which is done *repugnante conscientiâ*, the conscience of the doer flatly *gainsaying* it, that is indeed *against a mans conscience*, the conscience having already passed *a definitive sentence* the one way:) and no respect of circumstance whatsoever can free it from sin. But that which is done *dubitante conscientiâ*, the conscience of the doer onely doubting of it and no more, that is in truth no more *against a mans conscience* than *with* it, (the conscience as yet not having passed *a definitive sentence* either way) and such an action may either be *a sinne*, or *no sinne*; according to those qualifications which it may receive from other respects and circumstances. If the conscience have already passed *a judgment* upon a thing, and *condemned* it as simply unlawfull; in that case it is true that a man ought not by any means to do that thing, no not at *the command* of any Magistrate, no not although his *conscience* have pronounced a wrong *sentence*, and erred in that judgement: for then he should do it *repugnante conscientiâ*, he should go directly against his own *conscience*, which he ought not to do whatsoever come of it. In such a case certainly he

may not obey *the Magistrate*: yet let him know thus much withall, that he sinneth too in *disobeying* the Magistrate; from which sinne the following of *the judgement* of his own *conscience* cannot acquit him. And this is that fearfull *perplexity* whereof I spake, whereinto many a man casteth himself by his own *error* and *obstinacy*, that he can neither go *with* his conscience, nor *against* it, but he shall sinne. And who can help it, if a man will needs cherish *an errour*, and persist in it? But now if *the conscience* be onely *doubtfull* whether a thing be *lawfull* or no, but have not as yet passed a *peremptory judgement* against it, (yea, although it rather incline to think it *unlawfull:*) in that case if the Magistrate shall *command* it to be done, the subject with a good conscience *may* do it, nay, he cannot with a good conscience *refuse* to do it, though it be *dubitante conscientiâ*.

But you will yet say, that in doubtfull cases *the safer part* is to be chosen. So say I too; and am content *that rule* should decide *this question*: onely let it be rightly applyed. Thou thinkest it *safer*, where thou doubtest of the unlawfulnesse, *to forbear* then *to do*: as for example, if thou doubtest whether it be lawfull *to kneel* at the Communion, it is safest in thy opinion therefore for thee *not to kneel*. So should I think too, if thou wert left meerly to thine own *liberty*. But thou dost not consider how thou art caught in thine own net, and how the edge of thine own weapon may be turned upon thee point-blank not to be avoided, thus. If authority command thee *to kneel*, which whether it be lawful for thee to do, or not, *thou doubtest*; it cannot chuse but thou must needs *doubt* also, whether thou maiest lawfully *disobey*, or not. Now then here apply thine own Rule, *In dubiis pars tutior*, and see what will come of it. Judge, since thou canst not but

doubt

doubt in both cases, whether it be not *the safer* of the two, *to obey* doubtingly, than to *disobey doubtingly*. *Tene certum, demitte incertum*, is S. *Gregory* his rule: where there is *a certainty*, and *an uncertainty*, let the uncertainty go, and hold to that which is certain. Now *the general* is *certain*, that thou art to obey *the Magistrate* in all things not contrary to the will of God; but *the particular* is *uncertain*, whether the thing now commanded thee by *the Magistrate* be contrary to the will of God: (I say uncertain *to thee*, because thou *doubtest* of it) Deal *safely* therefore, and hold thee to that which is *certain*, and obey.

But thou wilt yet alledge, that *the Apostle* here condemneth the doing of any thing, not only with a *gainsaying*, but even with *a doubting* conscience: because *doubting* also is contrary to *faith*; and *he that doubteth is* even for that *condemned, if he eat*. Oh beware of mis-applying *Scripture*! it is a thing easily done, but not so easily answered. I know not any one gap that hath let in more and more dangerous errours into the Church, than this: that men take *the word*, of the sacred Text fitted to *particular occasions*, & to the condition of the *times* wherin they were written; and then *apply* them to themselvs and others as they find them, without due respect had to *the differences* that may be between those *times* & *cases*, & the present. Sundry things spoken of in Scripture agreeably to that *infancy* of the Church, would sort very ill with the Church in her fulness of *strength* and *stature*: and sundry directions very expedient in times of *persecution*, and when believers lived mingled with *Infidels*, would be very unseasonably urged where the Church is in a *peaceable* and *flourishing* estate, enjoying the *favour* and living under *the protection* of gracious and religious Princes. Thus *the Constitutions* that the Apostles made concerning *Deacons* & *widowes* in those

those primitive times are with much importunity, but very importunely withal, urged by *the Disciplinarians*: And sundry other like things I might instance of this kind, worthy the discovery, but that I fear to grow tedious. Briefly then, the Apostles whole discourse in this Chapter, and so wheresoever else he toucheth upon the point of *Scandals*, is to be understood only in that case where men are left *to their own liberty* in the use of indifferent things: the *Romans*, *Corinthians*, & others to whom S. *Paul* wrote about these matters, being not *limited* any way in the exercise of their *liberty* therein by any overruling *authority*. But where the Magistrates have interposed, & thought good upon mature advice to *impose Laws* upon those that are under them, whereby their *liberty* is (not *infringed*, as some unjustly complain, in the *inward judgement*, but only) *limited* in the *outward exercise* of it: there the Apostolical directions will not hold in the same *absolute manner*, as they were delivered to those, whom they then concerned; but only in *the equity* of them, so far forth as the cases are alike, & with such meet *qualifications* and *mitigations*, as the difference of the cases otherwise doth require. So that a man ought not out of private fancy, or meerly because he would not be observed for not doing as others do, or for any the like weak respects, to do that thing of the *Lawfulness* whereof he is not *competently perswaded*, where it is *free* for him to do otherwise: which was the case of these *weak ones* among *the Romans*, for whose sakes principally the Apostle gave these directions. But the *authority* of the Magistrates intervening so alters the case, that such a forbearance as to them was *necessary*, is to as many of us as are commanded to do this or that, altogether *unlawful*, in regard they were *free* and we are *bound*: for the reasons already shewn, which I now re-

rehearſe not. But you will yet ſay, (for in point of *obedience* men are very loth to *yield* ſo long as they can find any thing to *plead*,) thoſe that lay *theſe burdens* upon us, at leaſt wiſe ſhould do well to ſatisfie *our doubts* and *to inform* our conſciences concerning *the lawfulneſſe* of what they enjoyn: that ſo we might render them *obedience* with better *cheerfulneſs*. How willing are we ſinful men to leave the blame of our miſcarriages any where rather than upon our ſelves! But how is it not incongruous the while, that thoſe men ſhould *preſcribe rules* to their governours, who can ſcarcely brook their governours ſhould *preſcribe laws* to them? It were good we ſhould firſt *learn* how *to obey*, ere we take upon us *to teach* our betters how *to govern*. However, what *governours* are bound to do, or what is fit for them to do in the point of *information*, that is not now the queſtion. If they fail in any part of *their* bounden *duty*, they ſhall be ſure to reckon for it one day: but *their failing* cannot in the mean time excuſe *thy diſobedience*. Although I think it would prove a hard task, for whoſoever ſhould undertake it, to ſhew that *Superiours* are always bound *to inform* the conſciences of their inferiours concerning the *lawfulneſs* of every thing they ſhall command. If ſometimes they do it, where they ſee it *expedient* or *needful*; ſometimes again (and that perhaps oftner,) it may be thought more *expedient* for them, and more *conducible* for the publick peace and ſafety, only to make known to the people what their pleaſures are, reſerving to themſelves *the reaſons* thereof. I am ſure, in the point of *Eccleſiaſtical Ceremonies* and *Conſtitutions*, (in which caſe the aforeſaid allegations are uſually moſt ſtood upon,) this hath been abundantly done in our Church, not only in the learned writings of ſundry *private men*, but by the *publick declaration* alſo of authority, as is to be ſeen at large

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in *the preface* commonly printed before *the book of Common prayer* concerning that argument: enough to satisfie those that are peaceable, and not disposed to stretch their wits to cavil at things established. And thus much of the *second Question*, touching *a doubting conscience*: whereon I have insisted the longer, because it is a point both so proper to *the Text*, & whereat so many have stumbled.

There remaineth but one *other Question*, and that of far smaller difficulty: What is to be done, when the conscience is *scrupulous*? I call that a *scruple*, when a man is reasonably well perswaded of *the lawfullnesse* of a thing, yet hath withal some *jealousies* and *fears*, lest perhaps it should prove unlawful. Such scruples are most incident to men of *melancholy* dispositions, or of *timorous* spirits; especially if they be *tender conscienced* withall: and they are much encreased by the false *suggestions* of Satan; by reading *the books*, or hearing *the Sermons*, or frequenting *the company* of men more strict, precise, and austere in sundry points, than they need or ought to be; and by sundry other means which I now mention not. Of which *scruples* it behooveth every man, *first*, to be wary that he doth not at all *admit* them, if he can chuse: or, if he cannot wholly avoid them, that *secondly*, he endeavour so far as may be *to eject* them speedily out of his thoughts, as *Satans snares*, and things that may breed him worser inconveniencies: or, if he cannot be so rid of them, that then *thirdly*, he resolve to go on according to the more *profitable perswasion* of his mind, and *despise* those scruples. And this he may do with a good conscience, not only in things *commanded* him by lawful *authority*, but even in things *indifferent* and arbitrary, and wherein he is left to his own *liberty*.

FINIS.